What does the Political Economy Literature on Trade Policy (Not) Tell Us That We Ought to Know?
Rodrik, D. (1994)
Protection for Sale
Grossman, G. & E. Helpman (1994)
Abstract: We develop a model in which special interest groups make political contributions in order to influence an incumbent government's choice of trade policy. In the political equilibrium, the interest groups bid for protection, and each group's offer is optimal given the offers of the others. The politicians maximize their own welfare, which depends on the total amount of contributions collected and on the aggregate welfare of voters. We study the structure of protection that emerges in political equilibrium and the equilibrium contributions that are made by the different industry lobby groups, and show why these groups may in some cases prefer to have the government use trade policy to transfer income rather than more efficient means. We also discuss how our framework might be extended to include endogenous formation of lobby groups, political competition between incumbents and challengers, and political outcomes in a multicountry trading system.
Trade Wars & Trade Talks
Grossman, G. & E. Helpman (1995)
Abstract: When governments meet in the international arena, their actions reflect the political situations at home. Previous studies of trade relations have focused on governments that are immune from political pressures and that act as benevolent servants of the public interest. Here the authors introduce domestic politics into the analysis of international economic relations. They study the interactions between national leaders who are concerned with both providing a high standard of living to the general electorate and collecting campaign contributions from special-interest groups. The authors' analysis sheds light on the determinants of the structure of protection in noncooperative and cooperative policy equilibria.
Political Economy And International Economics
COLLECTED ESSAYS
Bhagwati, J. (1996)
The Economics And Politics Of Uniform Tariffs
Panagariya, A. (1996)
Political Economy And International Economics
Bhagwati, J. (D.A. Irwin, Editor) (1996)
Abstract: Political Economy and International Economics is the fifth volume of collected essays by the noted economist Jagdish Bhagwati. Following Essays in International Economic Theory (edited by Robert Feenstra) and Essays in Development Economics (edited by Gene Grossman), it reflects Bhagwati's wide range of interests and his rare ability to combine economic theory and political analysis.
The Political Economy of Trade Protection
CONFERENCE VOLUME
Krueger, A.O. (1996)
Abstract: This clear, concise summary of the in-depth analyses presented in The Political Economy of American Trade Policy examines the level, form, and evolution of American trade protection. In case studies of trade barriers imposed during the 1980s to help the steel, semiconductor, automobile, lumber, wheat, and textile and apparel industries, the contributors trace the evolution of efforts to obtain protection, protectionist measures, and their results. A chapter assessing the common themes that emerge from the studies concludes that the focus of current trade law is exclusively on the individual protection-seeking industries, with little regard for indirect effects on using industries or for consumers. Reform could usefully take these effects into account.
Trade, Democracy and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness
Boix, C. & A. Adserà (2000)
Did the Multi-fiber Agreement Make the NAFTA Politically More Acceptable? A Theoretical Analysis
Panagariya, A. & R.D. Gupta (2000)
Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policy: Menu Auctions with Imperfect Competition
Fung, K.C. & C. Lin (2000)
Voter Reactions Towards EMU: Did Foreign Trade Sensitivity Matter?
Thurner, P.W., A. Eymann & F.U. Pappi (2000)
Reciprocity and International Trade Politics: Lessons from the GATS
Crystal, J. (2000)
The USTR and Section 301: Strategic Unilateralism
Drope, J. (2000)
Trade Labour Link A Post Seattle Analysis
Panagariya, A. (2001)
Preferential Trade Liberalization: The Traditional Theory and New Developments
Panagariya, A. (2001)
Free Trade Areas and Rules of Origin: Economics and Politics
Panagariya, A. & R.D. Gupta (2001)
Multi-Issue Bargaining and Linked Agendas: Ricardo Revisited or No Pain No Gain
Horstmann, I.J., J.R. Markusen & J. Robles (2001)
Abstract: There has been much discussion about what issues should be included in international 'trade' negotiations. Different countries, firms and activists groups have quite different views regarding which items should (or should not) be negotiated together. Proposals run the gamut from no linking to linking trade with investment, the environment, labor and human-rights codes. This paper provides a formal framework for analyzing these questions. It employs a two-country, two-issue bargaining model and contrasts outcomes when issues are negotiated separately and when they are linked in some form. A key concept is 'comparative interest', analogous to Ricardian comparative advantage. We provide general results and note, in particular, where a country can benefit by agreeing to include an agenda item for which, when viewed by itself, the country does not receive a positive payoff.
On Modes of Economic Governance
Dixit, A.K. (2001)
Abstract: I consider transactions involving asymmetric prisoners’ dilemmas between pairs of players selected chosen from two large populations. Games are played repeatedly, but information about cheating is not adequate to sustain cooperation, and there is no official legal system of contract enforcement. I examine how profit-maximizing private intermediation can supply the information and enforcement. I obtain conditions under which private governance can improve upon no governance, and examine why it fails to achieve social optimality.
Trade Integration & Political Turbulence: Environmental Policy Consequences
Fredriksson, P.G. & M. Mani (2001)
Strategic Trade Policy, the 'Committed' versus 'Non-Committed' Government, and R&D Spillovers
Zigic, K. (2001)
A Theory of Unilateral Trade Policy
Wang, L. (2001)
Abstract: We integrate strategic-trade and political-economy considerations in a unified framework to analyze unilateral trade policy. Foreign firms compete on Home´s market through export or foreign direct investment (FDI). They also lobby Home´s government which sets trade (tariff) and industrial (tax) policies to maximize a weighted sum of domestic welfare and lobby contributions. We show that protection by a low-cost Home may improve global welfare by inducing a more cost-efficient global production pattern. The strategic-trade motive for unilateral intervention to increase domestic welfare may prevail even without domestic firms, and may be enhanced by the presence of FDI firms. The political motive to induce lobby contributions may mitigate or even reverse strategic-trade motivated policy deviations, and trade policy deviation need not benefit special interests to be politically optimal. If the government cares more about lobby contributions than about domestic welfare, it is more likely to adopt a liberal rather than a protectionist trade policy, regardless of its impact on lobbies.
Economic protectionism
Lee, D.R (2002)
Capital Movements and the Political Economy of Trade Policy
Neto, D. (2002)
'Steeling' House Votes at Low Prices for the Steel Import Quota Bill of 1999
Fisher, R.C., O. Gokcekus & E. Tower (2003)
Why Corporate Taxes May Rise: The Case of Trade Liberalization and Foreign Ownership
Kind, H.J., M. Karen-Helene & G. Schjelderup (2003)
Reciprocated Unilateralism in Trade Policy: An Interest-Group Approach | Published
Krishna, P. & D. Mitra (2003)
Spaghetti Regionalism or Strategic Foreign Trade: Some Evidence for Mexico
Ibarra-Yunez, A. (2003)
Why the Rush to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries
Milner, H. & K. Kubota (2003)
Endogenous tariffs and trade adjustment assistance
Magee, C. (2003)
Sweetening the Pot: How American Sugar Buys Protection
Gokcekus, O., J. Knowles & E. Tower (2003)
Trade, Wages and the Political Economy of Trade Protection: Evidence from the Colombian Trade Reforms | Published
Goldberg, P. & N. Pavcnik (2003/2005)
The Value of Multilateral Trade Liberalization and the Need for Third-Party Sanction
Chen, K.P., C.Z. Qin & L. Qiu (2003)
Foreign direct investment, economic freedom and growth: new evidence from Latin America
Bengoa, M. & B. Sanchez-Robles (2003)
Time-consistent protection with learning by doing
Miravete, E.J. (2003)
The Geography of Intra-Industry Trade: empirics
Venables, A.J., P.G. Rice & M. Stewart (2003)
Protection and the Business Cycle
Bagwell, K. & R.W. Staiger (2003)
Labor Versus Capital in Trade-Policy Determination: The Role of General-Interest and Special-Interest Politics
Dutt, P. & D. Mitra (2003)
Free Trade Areas and Rules of Origin: Economics and Politics
Duttagupta, R. & A. Panagariya (2003)
Which Country Sets the Tariff? The Political Economy of Tariff Determination in the European Community
Tavares, S.C. (2003)
Setting the Common Customs Tariff: Does the EU Act as a Country or as a Group of Countries?
Tavares, S.C. (2003)
Explaining Changes in the EU’s Customs Classification: New Products or Political Economy?
Tavares, S.C. (2003)
Unanticipated Delays: A Unified Model of Position Timing and Position Content
Boehmke, F.J. (2003)
The Political Economy of Litigation and Settlement at the WTO
Guzman, A. (2003)
The Political Economy of Restructuring and Subsidisation: An International Perspective
Everaert, G. (2003)
Foreign Lobbies and US Trade Policy
Gawande, K., P. Krishna & M.J. Robbins (2004)
A quantification of policy reform: an application to the Uruguay Round Negotiations on Agriculture
Redmond, W.J. (2004)
Free Trade, Reciprocity and Protectionism
Witzel, M. (2004)
Abstract: Who supports free trade over protectionism? A hundred years ago, it was the political right that favored free trade while the left was largely protectionist. This set shows how--despite drastic changes over the years--the basic parameters of this argument remain. The volumes include works by passionate supporters and opponents of protectionism as well as more neutral observations on the merits of each.
India's Trade Policy For Sale: How Much? Who Buys?
Cadot, O., J-M. Grether & M. Olarreaga (2003)
Abstract: This paper proposes a new method to test the Grossman-Helpman model of endogenous protection and lobby formation. This method, which does not require outside data on lobbies or contributions, identifies politically organized industries for trade protection purposes and calculates equilibrium contributions directly from the model using structural parameter estimates. Its emphasis on vertical inter-industry linkages makes it also possible to trace the effects of duty drawbacks and counter-lobbying from downstream users on endogenous protection. Applied to India, it yields results that are qualitatively consistent with the model’s predictions and that seem quantitatively more plausible than estimates given for the US by alternative methods. The weight on social welfare in the government’s objective function is 5, and the average contribution per ISIC sector is $33 million.
Trade, Politics,and the Environment: Tailpipe vs. Smokestack
McAusland, C. (2003)
Do Labor Issues Matter In The Determination Of U.S. Trade Policy? An Empirical Reevaluation
Matschke, X. & S. Sherlund (2003)
Political Pressure Deflection
Anderson, J.E. & M. Zanardi (2004)
Abstract: Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes - political pressure deflection. Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to `sell' is valuable to politicians. The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger, essentially like entry deterrence. U.S. trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example, especially antidumping law and its evolution.
Political Influence in a New Antidumping Regime: Evidence from Mexico | Alternative
Francois, J.F. & G. Niels (2004)
Free Riders Among the Rent-Seekers: A Model of Firm Participation in Antidumping Petitions
Olson, K.M. (2004)
Migration flows: Political Economy of Migration and the Empirical Challenges
O'Rourke, K.H. & R. Sinnott (2004)
Labor market rigidities and the political economy of trade protection
Matschke, X. (2004)
Abstract: Labor market rigidities are commonly believed to be a major reason for imposing trade impediments. In this paper, I introduce labor market rigidities (such as influential trade unions and high unemployment benefits), that are prevalent in continental European countries, into the well-known Grossman and Helpman (1994) protection for sale model, which has emerged as the leading model in the political economy of trade protection literature. I show that contrary to commonly held views, these labor market rigidities do not necessarily increase equilibrium trade protection. A testable equilibrium trade protection equation is also derived. The findings in this paper are hence particularly relevant for empirical tests of trade policy determinants in economies with more regulated labor markets.
Macro Economic Determinants of Antidumping: A Comparative Analysis of Developed and Developing Countries
Aggarwal, A. (2004)
Terrorism and international trade: an empirical investigation
Nitsch, V. & D. Schumacher (2004)
Global corporations and local politics: income redistribution vs. FDI subsidies
Janeba, E. (2004)
The Political Economy of Trans-Pacific Business Linkages
Henisz, W. (2004)
Protection versus Promotion: An Empirical Investigation
Mitra, D., D.D. Thomakos & M.A. Ulubasoglu (2004)
Four Simple Tests of Campaign Contributions and Trade Policy Preferences
Beaulieu, E. & C. Magee (2004)
Political Externalities, Nondiscrimination, and a Multilateral World
Ethier, W.J. (2004)
The Returns from Rent-Seeking: Campaign Contributions, Firm Subsidies, and the Byrd Amendment
Liebman, B. & K.M. Olson (2004)
Trade, Standards, and the Political Economy of Genetically Modified Food
Anderson, K., R. Damania & L.A. Jackson (2004)
From Protectionism to Regionalism: Multinational Firms and Trade-Related Investment Measures
Chase, K.A. (2004)
Negotiating Free Trade | Published
Aghion, P., P. Antras & E. Helpman (2004/07)
Abstract: We develop a dynamic bargaining model in which a leading country endogenously decides whether to sequentially negotiate free trade agreements with subsets of countries or engage in simultaneous multilateral bargaining with all countries at once. We show how the structure of coalition externalities shapes the choice between sequential and multilateral bargaining, and we identify circumstances in which the grand coalition is the equilibrium outcome, leading to worldwide free trade. A model of international trade is then used to illustrate equilibrium outcomes and how they depend on the structure of trade and protection. Global free trade is not achieved when the political-economy motive for protection is sufficiently large. Furthermore, the model generates both building bloc' and stumbling bloc' effects of preferential trade agreements. In particular, we describe an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are permitted to form (a building bloc effect), and an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are forbidden (a stumbling bloc effect). The analysis identifies conditions under which each of these outcomes emerges.
Trade, Standards, and the Political Economy of Genetically Modified Food
Anderson, K., R. Damania & L.A. Jackson (2004)
Reciprocated Unilateralism in Trade Reforms with Majority Voting | Published
Krishna, P. & D. Mitra (2004)
How Outsourcing Affects Bilateral Political Relations
Polachek, Solomon W. (2004)
Trade Still Follows the Flag: The Primacy of Politics in a Simultaneous Model of Interdependence and Armed Conflict
Keshk, O.M.G., B.M. Pollins & R. Reuveny (2004)
Hormone beef, chlorinated chicken and international trade
Calzolari, G. & G. Immordino (2004)
Abstract: We study international trade in innovative goods subject to uncertain consumer health effects. Such goods are often at the center of international trade disputes. We show that an interesting form of protectionism may arise because of scientific uncertainty. A free-riding effect is identified, implying more conservative behavior by countries. We also study the role of producers (lobbies) in providing valuable information, finding that the innovative lobby has an advantage in providing information as compared with the lobby producing the ‘traditional’ good. Moreover, lobbies disclose more information when the health effects are long lasting.
Who Makes the Rules of Globalization?
Deardorff, A.V. (2004)
The Political Economy of Job Protection and Income Redistribution
Amable, B. & D. Gatti (2004)
Enforcement, Private Political Pressure and the GATT/WTO Escape Clause
Bagwell, K. & R.W. Staiger (2004)
Cultural Biases in Economic Exchange
Guiso, L., P. Sapienza & L. Zingales (2004)
A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics | Published
Grossman, G.M. & E. Helpman (2004/05)
Socially Responsible Trade Integration: A Political Economy Perspective
Verdier, T. (2004)
The Clash of Liberalizations: Preferential versus Multilateral Trade Liberalization in the European Union
Karacaoval, B. & N. Limao (2005)
Abstract: There has been an explosion in the number of preferential trade agreements in the past decade. Preferential trade agreements are characterized by liberalization with respect to only a few partners and thus they can potentially clash with and retard multilateral trade liberalization. Despite this important concern with preferential trade agreements, there is almost no systematic evidence on whether they actually affect multilateral trade liberalization. Karacaovali and Limão model the effect of preferential trade agreements on multilateral trade liberalization and show that preferential trade agreements slow down multilateral trade liberalization unless they have a common external tariff and allow for internal transfers. Next, they use detailed data on product-level tariffs negotiated by the European Union in the past two multilateral trade rounds to structurally estimate their model. The authors confirm the main prediction—the European Union’s preferential trade agreements have clashed with its multilateral trade liberalization–-and find that the effect is quantitatively significant. Moreover, they also confirm several auxiliary predictions of the model and provide new evidence on the political economy determinants of multilateral liberalization in the European Union.
Learning to Act on World Trade Preference Formation of Large Firms in the United States and the European Union
Woll, C. (2005)
The Role of Importers and Exporters in the Determination of the U.S. Tariff Preferences Granted to Latin America
Silva, P. (2005)
Trade Liberalization and the Politics of Financial Development
Braun, M. & C. Raddatz (2005)
The Globalization of Trade and Democracy, 1870-2000
Lopez-Cordova, J.E. & C.M. Meissner (2005)
Political Ideology and Endogenous Trade Policy: An Empirical Investigation
Dutt, P. & D. Mitra (2005)
Trade, turnover, and tithing
Magee, C.S.P., C. Davidson & S.J. Matusz (2005)
Protection for Sale with Imperfect Rent Capturing
Facchini, G., J. Van Biesebroeck & G. Willmann (2005)
Meta-Strategic Lobbying: The 1998 Steel Imports Case
Brook, D.A. (2005)
Lobbying Competition Over US Trade Policy
Gawande, K. & P. Krishna (2005)
Political Economy of Antidumping and Safeguards in Argentina
Nogues, J.J. & E. Baracat (2005)
American Trade Politics, 4th edition
Destler, I.M. (2005)
Abstract: In this comprehensive revision of the most influential, widely read analysis of the US trade policymaking system, Destler addresses how globalization has reshaped trade politics, weakening traditional protectionism but intensifying concern about trade’s societal impacts. Entirely new chapters treat the deepening of partisan divisions and the rise of “trade and . . .” issues (especially labor and the environment). The author concludes with a comprehensive economic and political strategy to cope with globalization and maximize its benefits. The original edition of American Trade Politics won the Gladys Kammerer Award of the American Political Science Association for the best book on US national policy.
Protection for sale under monopolistic competition
Chang, P-L. (2005)
How can the security of international trade be financed in developing countries? A global public good approach
Dulbecco, P. & B. Laporte (2005)
The political economy of international factor mobility
Facchini, G. & G. Willmann (2005)
The sources of protectionist drift in representative democracies
Laussel, D. & R. Riezman (2005)
Rules of Origin as Export Subsidies
Cadot, O., A. Estevadeordal & A. Suwa-Eisenmann (2005)
Rent Seeking with Politically Contestable Rights to Tariff-rate Import Quotas
Hranaiova, J. & H. de Gorter (2005)
Globalization and International Conflict: Can FDI Increase Peace?
Polachek, S., C. Seiglie & J. Xiang (2005)
Trade creating free trade areas and the undermining of multilateralism
Ornelas, E. (2005)
The sources of protectionist drift in representative democracies
Laussel, D. & R. Riezman (2005)
Who Wants to Globalize? Consumer Tastes and Labor Markets in a Theory of Trade Policy Beliefs
Baker, A. (2005)
Economic Policy Responses to Preference Erosion: From Trade as Aid to Aid for Trade
Hoekman, B. & S. Prouse (2005)
The Structure of Lobbying and Protection in U.S. Agriculture
Gawande, K. (2005)
A Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements
Maggi, G. & A. Rodriguez-Clare (2005)
Endogenous free trade agreements and the multilateral trading system
Ornelas, E. (2005)
Rent Destruction and the Political Viability of Free Trade Agreements
Ornelas, E. (2005)
Collateral Damage: Trade Disruption and the Economic Impact of War
Glick, R. & A.M. Taylor (2005)
Postbellum Protection and Commissioner Wells's Conversion to Free Trade
Meardon, S. (2005)
Household Inequality, Welfare, and the Setting of Trade Policy
Francois, J. & H. Rojas-Romagosa (2006)
Affinity and International Trade
Noland, M. (2005)
Voting on Tariff and Retaliation
van Ypersele, T. (2006)
Protection for Sale Made Easy
Baldwin, R. & Robert-Nicoud, F. (2006)
Trade, inequality, and the political economy of institutions
Levchenko, A.A. & Q-T. Do (2006)
Political risk and capital flight
Le, Q.V. & P.J. Zak (2006)
Antebellum Tariff Politics: Coalition Formation and Shifting Regional Interests
Irwin, D.A. (2006)
Putting the Lid on Lobbying: Tariff Structure and Long-Term Growth when Protection is for Sale
Nunn, N. & D. Trefler (2006)
Globalisation and the Mix of Wage and Profit Taxes
Haufler, A., A. Klemm & G. Schjelderup (2006)
Democracy and Protectionism
O'Rourke, K.H. & A.M. Taylor (2006)
Protection for Sale or Surge Protection?
Imai, S., H. Katayama & K. Krishna (2006)
Institutional quality and trade: Which institutions? Which trade?
Pierre-Guillaume M. & K. Sekkat (2006)
Productivity matters for trade policy : theory and evidence
Karacaovali, B. (2006)
Selling Protection for Sale
Ethier, W.J. (2006)
Democracy and globalisation | Published
Eichengreen, B. & D. Leblang (2006/08)
Corruption and trade protection: evidence from panel data
Bandyopadhyay, S. & S. Roy (2006)
Food Protection for Sale
Lopez, R.A. & X. Matschke (2006)
The FTAA and the political economy of protection in Brazil and the US
de Paiva Abreu, M. (2006)
Trade, Peace and Democracy: An Analysis of Dyadic Dispute
Polachek, S.W. & C. Seiglie (2006)
Competitive Proposals of Policies by Lobbies
Chaturvedi, A. & A. Glazer (2006)
The political economy of antidumping
REVIEW PAPER
Nelson, D. (2006)
Globalization and Domestic Conflict
Garfinkel, M.R., S. Skaperdas & C. Syropoulos (2006)
Capital Movements and the Political Economy of Trade Policy
Neto, D.G. (2006)
Trade Openness and Preferences for Redistribution: A Cross-National Assessment of the Compensation Hypothesis
Ventura, L.B. (2006)
Is There a Human Right to Free Movement? Immigration and Original Ownership of the Earth
Blake, M. & M. Risse (2006)
Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocs on the Path to Global Free Trade
Baldwin, R. (2006)
Are antidumping duties for sale? case-level evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Protection for Sale Model
Evans, C.L. &. S.M. Sherlund (2006)
Market access for sale
Kee, H.L., M. Olarreaga & P. Silva (2006)
Political risk and export promotion: evidence from Germany
Moser, C., T. Nestmann & M. Wedow (2006)
The Political Economy of Agricultural Protection
Thies, C.G. & S. Porche (2007)
Institutions, Infrastructure and Trade
Francois, J. & M. Manchin (2007)
International trade and rent sharing among developed and developing countries
Fontagnéa, L. & D. Mirza (2007)
Making Anarchy Work: International Legal Institutions and Trade Cooperation
Kono, D.Y. (2007)
Impacts of interest groups: Endogenous interaction and lobbying limit
Ho, S.J. (2007)
Can compensation save free trade?
Davidson, C., S.J. Matusz & D.R. Nelson (2007)
Inefficient policies, inefficient institutions and trade
Segura-Cayuela, R. (2007)
Good Governance, Trade and Agglomeration
Candau, F. (2007)
Why are people more pro-trade than pro-migration?
Mayda, A.M. (2007)
Trade policy: What's welfare got to do with it?
Damania, R. & P.G. Fredriksson (2007)
The Role of Immigration in Sustaining the Social Security System: A Political Economy Approach
Sand, E. & A. Razin (2007)
The Politics of Wine: Trade Barriers, Interest Groups, and the Commerce Clause
Wiseman, A.E. & J. Ellig (2007)
Foreign Discrimination, Protection for Exporters, and U.S. Trade Liberalization
Dur, A. (2007)
A Quantile Based Test of Protection for Sale Model
Imai, S., H. Katayama & K. Krishna (2007)
Ideology, Inequality and Inequitable Trade Policies
Djerdjian, D.O. (2007)
China's WTO Entry: Antidumping, Safeguards, and Dispute Settlement
Bown, C.P. (2007)
Political Stasis or Protectionist Rut? Policy Mechanisms for Trade Reform in a Democracy
Blanchard, E. & G. Willmann (2007)
State Visits and International Trade
Nitschr, V. (2007)
The Common External Tariff in a Customs Union: Voting, Logrolling, and National Government Interests
Tavares, S.C. (2007)
Capital, Trade, and the Political Economies of Reform
Brooks, S.M. & M.J. Kurtz (2007)
Trade and Major Power Alliance Decisions
Fordham, B.O. (2007)
Can Openness Deter Corruption? The Role of Foreign Direct Investment
Larrain B., F. & J. Tavares (2007)
Political asymmetry and common external tariff in a customs union
Bandyopadhyay, S., S. Lahiri & S. Roy (2007)
The Political Economy of Services Trade Liberalization: A Case for International Regulatory Cooperation?
Hoekman, B., A. Mattoo & A. Sapir (2007)
Trade Policies as Signals of Private Political Pressure
Sawaki, H. (2007)
The quality of institutions and foreign direct investment
Daude, C. & E. Stein (2007)
Rent seeking, interest groups and environmental lobbying: Cane Farmers versus Great Barrier Reef Protectionists
Beard, R. (2007)
Equity and Trade Policy
Francois, J. & H. Rojas-Romagosa (2007)
Do rapid political and trade liberalizations increase corruption?
Tavares, S.C. (2007)
Is Protection Really for Sale? A Survey and Directions for Future Research
Imai, S., H. Katayama & K. Krishna (2008)
Investment and Expropriation under Oligarchy and Democracy in a Heckscher-Ohlin World
Albornoz, F., S. Galiani & D. Heymann (2008)
The sustainable cooperative tariffs : a political economy perspective
Mehdi, R. (2008)
Regionalism or Multilateralism? A Political Economy Choice
Albertin, G. (2008)
A Swing-State Theory of Trade Protection in the Electoral College
Muuls, M. & D. Petropoulou (2008)
Bilateral Trade in the Shadow of Armed Conflict
Long, A.G. (2008)
Domestic Responses to Free Trade and Free Finance in OECD Economies
Verdier, D. (1998)
The Political Economy of European Exchange Rates: An Empirical Assessment
Frieden, J. (1998)
Political Contagion in Currency Crises
Drazen, A. (1999)
The Negotiation Process and International Economic Organizations
Odell, J. (1999)
The Politics of Speculative Attacks in Industrial Democracies
Leblang, D. & Bernhard, W. (1999)
From the Exchange Stabilisation Fund to the International Monetary Fund
Bordo, M. (2000)
Defending or Devaluing: The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy
Leblang, D. (2000)
Agency and Delegation in IMF Conditionality
Martin, L. (2000)
Risk and Reward: Agency, Contracts, and the Expansion of IMF Conditionality
Kapur, D. (2000)
Private Capital, Central Banks, and International Monetary Governance: A Necessary Connection?
Kahler, M. (2000)
The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 20th Century
Rajan, R.G. & L. Zingales (2001)
Competing and Complementary Explanations of Monetary Regime Choice
Clark, W.R. (2000)
Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes
Broz, J.L. (2000)
Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments
Keefer, P. & D. Stasavage (2000)
Multiple Hands on the Wheel: Exchange-Rate Regimes, International Financial Exposure, Central Bank Autonomy, and Inflation in the Open Economy
Franzese Jr., R.J. (2000)
Who Recovers First? Banking Crisis Resolution in Developing Countries
Montinola, G. (2000)
Currency Instability and Government Change
Chang, M. (2000)
Comparative Context and Public Preferences over Regional Economic Integration
Scheve, K. (2000)
Merging East and West: How Eastern Europeans Form Opinions About Economic Integration into the European Union
Anderson, C.J. & Y.V. Tverdova (2000)
Political Processes and Foreign Exchange Markets
Bernhard, W. & D. Leblang (2000)
Some Political Economy Aspects of EMU
Willett, T.D. (2000)
The Political Economy of External Discipline: Constraint Versus Incentive Effects of Capital Mobility and Exchange Rate Pegs
Willett, T.D. (2001)
The Political Economy of International Unions | Published
Alesina, A., I. Angeloni & F. Etro (2001/2005)
Politics and the Determinants of Banking Crises: the Effects of Political Checks and Balances
Keefer, P. (2002)
Fear of Floating Needn't Imply Fixed Rates: Feasible Options for Intermediate Exchange Rate Regimes
Willett, T.D. (2002)
The Political Economy of Perverse Financial Liberalization: Examples from the Asian Crisis
Willett, T.D. & N.N. Auerbach (2002)
Critical Realism and the Political Economy of the Euro
Arestis, P., A. Brown & M. Sawyer (2002)
Implications of EMU Enlargement for European Monetary Policy: A Political Economy View
Maier, P. & M. Hendrikx (2002)
A Political-Economic Model of the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime
Sun, Y. (2002)
Political Economy of Oil-Revenue Sharing in a Developing Country: Illustrations from Nigeria
Ahmad, E. & R. Singh (2003)
The Political Economy of EU Enlargement: Lessons from Switzerland
de Melo, J., M. Florence & T. Müller (2003)
Financial Infrastructure, Group Interests and Capital Accumulation
Bossone, b., s. Mahajan & F. Zahir (2003)
Political Relationships, Global Financing and Corporate Transparency
Leuz, C. & F. Oberholzer-Gee (2003)
The Political Economy of Capital Income and Profit Taxation in a Small Open Economy
Huizinga, H. & S.B. Nielsen
Lobbying by Ethnic Groups and Aid Allocation
Lahiri, S. & P. Raimondos-Møller (2003)
The Politics of Foreign Aid
Mayer, W. & P. Raimondos-Møller (2003)
The Monetary Geography of Africa
Masson, P. & C. Pattillo (2003)
Abstract: This book describes the use of moneys in Africa, currently and in the recent past, and attempts to draw conclusions concerning the evolution of exchange rate regimes in the future. Before getting into the substance, two questions need to be answered: what is the meaning of "monetary geography," and why is it an interesting topic for Africa? We have adapted the term "monetary geography" from the title of a book by Benjamin Cohen, The Geography of Money. In that book, Cohen argues forcefully that money has become "deterritorialized," that is, the circulation of a particular money is no longer coterminous with the country of issue. A prime case in point is the creation of the euro, which is not associated with a single country but rather with a supranational central bank. In addition, foreign currencies circulate widely in many developing countries, because of uncertainty about the ability of the domestic currency to maintain its value. Thus, in this book, we are concerned with the use of money, whether within the issuing country's borders or outside of them. We are especially interested in the potential spread of regional currency areas. In keeping with the geographical notion, we will rely on maps to convey some of the key data not only on the use of moneys but also on the economic variables that influence their use and determine the value of money. This brings us to the second question: why is that an interesting topic in Africa today? In fact, Africa is arguably a more useful laboratory for studying the use of money than is Europe. It contains two monetary unions characterized by joint decision-making among sovereign states that have existed for some 40 years, the two CFA franc zones, and a monetary area between South Africa and smaller neighboring countries, in which South Africa sets monetary policy, that dates back to the early years of the 20th century. This justifies a more thorough look at the African experience than has been attempted thus far, in notable contrast to the European case, which has received enormous attention. Moreover, the African continent has several projects for further monetary unions that are intended to culminate in a single African currency. So there is a great need for analysis of the advisability of the monetary union projects and for research into how best to proceed. We hope that this book goes some way towards meeting those needs.
Political conditions and currency crises in emerging markets
Block, S.A. (2003)
IMF arrangements, politics and the timing of stabilizations
Veiga, F.J. (2003)
Globalization and the Politics of International Finance: The Stiglitz Verdict
REVIEW PAPER
Basu, K. (2003)
Democratization’s Risk Premium: Partisan and Opportunistic Political Business Cycle Effects on Sovereign Ratings in Developing Countries
Block, S., B.N. Schrage & P.M. Vaaler (2003)
The Political-Economy of Argentina’s Debacle
Buscaglia, M.A. (2003)
Endogenous Financial Openness: Efficiency and Political Economy Considerations
Aizenman, J. & I. Noy (2003)
Does Foreign Aid Promote the Expansion of Government?
Remmer, K.L. (2003)
The Political Economy of Unconditional and Conditional Foreign Assistance: Grants vs. Loan Rollovers
Mayer, W. (2004)
The Influence of IMF Programs on the Re-election of Debtor Governments
Dreher, A. (2004)
The Power of Money: Global Capital and Policy Choices in Developing Countries
Shambaugh, G.E. (2004)
The European Union: A Politically Incorrect View
Alesina, A. & R. Perotti (2004)
Political Competition and Economic Growth: Lessons from the Political Economy of Banking in Mexico and the United States
Haber, S. (2004)
The Political Economy of Conditional and Unconditional Foreign Assistance: Grants vs. Loan Rollovers
Mourmouras, A.T. & W. Mayer (2004)
A Failure Story: Politics and Financial Liberalization in Turkey, Revisiting the Revolving Door Hypothesis
Demir, F. (2004)
Exchange Rate Variability and Lobbies
Goncalves, C.E.S. (2004)
The Politics of Economic Reform in Thailand: Crisis and Compromise
Hicken, A. (2004)
One Country, One Vote? Labor Market Structure and Voting Rights in the ECB
Berger, H. & C. Hefeker (2004)
Elections and the timing of devaluations
Stein, E.H. & J.M. Streb (2004)
Abstract: This paper presents a rational political budget cycle model where devaluation acts as a tax on consumption due to a cash-in-advance constraint. Competent governments can signal their competency by reducing the rate of devaluation prior to elections. When voters also ignore the degree to which governments are opportunistic, i.e. the extent to which they are willing to distort the economy for electoral gain, an incompetent, opportunistic incumbent can reduce the rate of devaluation in the run-up to an election. The main theoretical implication in either setup, that the rate of devaluation is significantly higher in the months following an election, is consistent with evidence drawn from 26 countries in Latin America.
Redistribution to Rent Seekers, Foreign Aid and Economic Growth
Hodler, R. (2004)
Regional Integration and Third-Country Inward Investment
Markusen, J. (2004)
The Political Economy of Deposit Insurance
Laeven, L. (2004)
Money-Based Versus Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilization: Is There Space for Political Opportunism? | Published
Aisen, A. (2004/07)
The Quality of Foreign Aid: Country Selectivity or Donors Incentives?
Wane, W. (2004)
Direct Investment, Rising Real Wages and the Absorption of Excess Labor in the Periphery
Dooley, M.P., D. Folkerts-Landau & P. Garber (2004)
The price of democracy: sovereign risk ratings, bond spreads and political business cycles in developing countries
Block, S.A. & P.M. Vaaler (2004)
On US politics and IMF Lending
Andersen, T.B., T. Harr & F. Tarp (2004)
Political support to public debt repudiation in a Monetary Union - the role of the geographical allocation of debt
Di Gioacchino, D., S. Ginebri & L. Sabani (2004)
Unions and the political economy of immigration
Ceroni, C.B. & G. Bellettini (2004)
Capital Controls: a Political Economy Approach
Alfaro, L. (2004)
The Economic and Politics Determinants of IMF and World Bank Lending in the Middle East and North Africa
Harrigan, J., C. Wang & H. El-Said (2004)
Corruption and public finance: an IMF perspective
Hillman, A.L. (2004)
On the Political Economy of Immigration and Income Redistribution
Dolmas, J. & G.W. Huffman (2004)
International Capital Mobility and Trade Politics: Capital Flows, Political Coalitions, and Lobbying
Hiscox, M.J. (2004)
Elections, Special Interests, and the Fiscal Costs of Financial Crisis
Keefer, P. (2004)
Can Public Discussion Enhance Program Ownership?
Drazen, A. & P. Isard (2004)
The political economy of east Asian economic integration
Tourk, K. (2004)
How Should Large and Small Countries Be Represented in a Currency Union?
Berger. H. & T. Mueller (2004)
The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision
Widgren, M. & S. Napel (2004)
Dollarization and political risk: Is there a forum for debate?
Arbeláez, H. (2005)
How Do Political Changes Influence U.S. Bilateral Aid Allocations? Evidence from Panel Data
Fleck, R.K. & C. Kilby (2005)
EU Fiscal Rules: Issues and Lessons from Political Economy
Schuknecht, L. (2004)
Congressional Politics of International Financial Rescues
Broz, J.L. (2005)
Global Aging and Fiscal Policy with International Labor Mobility: A Political Economy Perspective
Tosun, M.S. (2005)
Bank Supervision and Corruption in Lending | Published
Beck, T., A. Demirgüç-Kunt & R. Levine (2005/06)
Elections and Exchange Rate Policy Cycles
Bonomo, M. & C. Terra (2005)
Abstract: This paper presents a theoretical model based on the distributive effects of real exchange rate (RER) changes that generates RER electoral cycles of the type identified in Latin American countries: more appreciated RER before elections and more depreciated after elections. Typically, a RER depreciation favors exporters and import-competing domestic industries, to the detriment of consumers. These RER cycles are generated by imperfect information on policy-makers' preferences, which are concealed from voters with the help of an unstable macroeconomic environment. Exchange rate cycles result from the interplay between the electoral power of the non-tradable sector and the tradable sector's ability to lobby the government.
Which Variables Explain Decisions on IMF Credit? An Extreme Bounds Analysis
Sturm, J-E., H. Berger & J. de Haan (2005)
The Political Economy of Seigniorage
Aisen, A. & J. Francisco (2005)
The Stability of the Inter-war Gold Exchange Standard. Did Politics Matter?
Wandschneider, K. (2005)
What drives international bank flows? Politics, institutions and other determinants
Papaioannou, E. (2005)
Real Exchange Rate Cycles Around Elections
Stein, E.H., J.M. Streb & P. Ghezzi (2005)
Income Distribution, Sovereign Debt, and Public Investment
Karayalcin, C. & K. McCollister (2005)
The Political Economy of Fixed Exchange Rates: A Survival Analysis
Setzer, R. (2005)
IMF programs: Who is chosen and what are the effects?
Barro, R.J. & J-W. Lee (2005)
Financial Crises and Political Crises | Published
Chang, R. (2005/07)
Abstract: This paper is an analysis of the simultaneous determination of financial default and political crises and its consequences. It focuses on a small open economy that faces a debt default decision. Crucially, this decision is made by a government that has superior information than the public about the social costs of default. Citizens can dismiss the government, and overrule its default decision, at the cost of a political crisis. If there is a divergence between the objectives of the government and its people, a political crisis may emerge in equilibrium. For this to be the case, the foreign debt must be large enough, and international reserves low. When this political equilibrium is seen as a part of a larger investment problem, there are equilibria in which crises are "only financial," and equilibria in which both default and political crises occur. In some cases, these two kinds of equilibria coexist and, in this sense, a loss of confidence by foreign lenders can exacerbate the likelihood of a political crisis. If so, international intervention in financial markets may ensure financial and political stability at little cost.
Bagehot or Bailout? An Analysis of Government Responses to Banking Crises
Rosas, G. (2005)
The Politics of Bank Failures: Evidence from Emerging Markets
Brown, C.O. & D.I. Serdar (2005)
The Political Economy of Financial Fragility | Alternative
Feijen, E. & E.C. Perotti (2005)
Political Pressures and Monetary Mystique
Geraats, P.M. (2005)
Regulatory Capture in Banking
Hardy, D.C. (2006)
Globalisation and the mix of wage and profit taxes
Haufler, A., A. Klemm & G. Schjelderup (2006)
The Political Economy of Financial Liberalisation
Shortland, A. & S. Girma (2005)
The Evolution of International Political Risk 1956-2001
Tunaru, R. & E. Clark (2005)
Project Aid or Budget Aid? The Interests of Governments and Financial Institutions
Hefeker, C. (2005)
Shareholder Protection, Stock Market Development and Politics
Pagano, M. & P.F. Volpin (2006)
Central Bank Independence and the `Free Lunch Puzzle': A New Perspective
al-Nowaihi, A., P. Levine & A. Mandilaras (2006)
Can Budget Institutions Counteract Political Indiscipline?
Fabrizio, S. & A. Mody (2006)
On the political economy of financial reform
Huang, Y. (2006)
Electoral Uncertainty and the Volatility of International Capital Flows
Chang, R. (2006)
EMU Enlargement, Policy Uncertainty and Economic Reforms
Hefeker, C. (2006)
Geography Rules Too! Economic Development and the Geography of Institutions
Bosker, M. & H. Garretsen (2006)
Does membership on the UN Security Council influence IMF decisions? Evidence from panel data
Dreher, A., J-E. Sturm & J.R. Vreeland (2006)
Give Trust a Chance--A Model of Trust in the Context of an IMF-Supported Program
Sembene, D. (2007)
Testing and Measuring the Role of Ideas: The Case of Neoliberalism in the International Monetary Fund
Chwieroth, J.M. (2007)
When Globalization Discontent Turns Violent: Foreign Economic Liberalization and Internal War
Bussman, M. & G. Schneider (2007)
Preferences for Protectionism: Do economic factors really matter?
Melgar, N., J. Milgram & M. Rossi (2007)
Politically Optimal Fiscal Policy
Kumhof, M. & I. Yakadina (2007)
Banking on Democracy: The Political Economy of International Private Bank Lending in Emerging Markets
Rodríguez, J. & J. Santiso (2007)
Foreign Exchange Intervention and the Political Business Cycle : A Panel Data Analysis
Dreher, A. & R. Vaubel (2007)
Bono Made Jesse Helms Cry: Jubilee 2000, Debt Relief, and Moral Action in International Politics
Busby, J.W. (2007)
The Political Economy of Numbers: On the Application of Benford's Law to International Macroeconomic Statistics
Nye, J. & C. Moul (2007)
The Politics of IMF Forecasts
Dreher, A., S. Marchesi & J.R. Vreeland (2007)
Bank bailouts and political instability
Vaugirard, V. (2007)
Default, Electoral Uncertainty and the Choice of Exchange Regime
Hefeker, C. (2007)
The Role of Institutional Quality in a Currency Crisis Model
Wu, Y. (2008)
Abstract: This paper is a theoretical study of the impact of institutional quality on currency crises from a public finance point of view. Recent empirical studies leave little doubt that weak institutions, including high levels of corruption, hinder economic performance. After the East Asian crisis, many observers have pointed to widespread corruption and crony capitalism as an underlying cause. Despite the popularity of the claim, there are only limited empirical and especially theoretical studies on the link between institutional quality and currency crises. This paper intends to fill in this void. We model institutional weakness as an inefficiency of the tax collection system. The model derived here shows that institutional weakness generally increases the likelihood of the existence of a self-fulfilling crisis equilibrium, and leads to larger currency devaluation when crises happen. However, this relationship could reverse when institutional weakness is very severe.
Political Monetary Cycles and a New de facto Ranking of Central Bank Independence
Alpanda, S. & A. Honig (2008)
The Impact of Political Risk on Sovereign Bond Spreads: Evidence from Latin America
Moser, C. (2008)
Political Economy Origins of Financial Markets in Europe and Asia
Andrianova, S., P. Demetriades & C. Xu (2008)
Political and institutional factors in regime change in the ERM: An application of duration analysis
Sosvilla-Rivero, S. & F. Pérez-Bermejo (2008)
The governance of the World Bank : analysis and implications of the decisional power of the G10
Foch, A. (2008)
Exchange Rate Determination: A Model of the Decisive Role of Central Bank Cooperation and Conflict
Pope, R., R. Selten, S. Kube, J. Kaiser & J. von Hagen (2008)
Politically generated uncertainty and currency crises: Theory, tests, and forecasts
Leblang, D. & S. Satyanath (2008)
Political Business Cycles through Lobbying
Bonomo, M. & C. Terra (2008)
Do IMF Programs Improve Economic Governance?
Honda, J. (2008)
Theory and Structure in International Political Economy: An International Organization Reader
CONFERENCE VOLUME
Cohen, B.J. & C. Lipson (Editors) (1999)
Abstract: This is the first of two anthologies on international political economy drawn from articles published in the journal International Organization. The book is organized into four sections: Contending Theoretical Perspectives, International Regimes, Multilateralism and International Leadership, and International Economy and Domestic Politics.
Issues and Agents in International Political Economy: An International Organization Reader
CONFERENCE VOLUME
Cohen, B.J. & C. Lipson (Editors) (1999)
Abstract: This is the second of two anthologies on international political economy drawn from articles published in the journal International Organization. The book is organized into four sections: Trade, Multinational Firms and Globalization, Money and Finance, and Emerging Issues.
Democracy and International Financial Liberalization
Quinn, D.P. (2000)
The International Political Economy of the Environment: Critical Perspectives
Stevis, D. & V. Assetto (Editors) (2001)
Abstract: The authors of this volume investigate the framing of both problems and solutions to clarify the particular political dynamics and preferences that they reflect and legitimate. They intend to do this without assuming, as they believe many practitioners and scholars do, that while there may be disagreement about solutions, everyone knows what the problems are. This publication intends to combine theory with empirical research in order to raise theoretical questions at the core of research and policymaking that values social equity and environmental health. In combination, they intend to tell a cohesive, substantive story about the IPE of the environment at the beginning of the third millennium.
The Evolution of Suffrage Institutions in the New World
Engerman, S.L. & K.L. Sokoloff (2001)
Economic Reform, Democracy and Growth During Post-Communist Transition
Fidrmuc, J. (2001)
Political Instability and Growth in Dictatorships
Overland, J., K.L. Simons & M. Spagat (2001)
Multiple Politico-Economic Regimes, Inequality and Growth
Desdoigts, A. & F. Moizeau (2001)
Abstract: We provide a cultural explanation to the phenomenon of corruption in the framework of an overlapping generations model with intergenerational transmission of values. We show that the economy has two steady states with different levels of corruption. The driving force in the equilibrium selection process is the education effort exerted by parents which depends on the distribution of ethics in the population and on expectations about future policies. We propose some policy interventions which via parents' efforts have long-lasting effects on corruption and show the success of intensive education campaigns. Educating the young is a key element in reducing corruption successfully.
The European Central Bank and Legitimacy Is the ECB a Modification of or an Exception to the Principle of Democracy?
Leino, P. (2001)
Independent and Accountable Central Banks and the European Central Bank
de Sousa, P.A.B. (2001)
The Political Economy of International Emissions Trading Scheme Choice: Empirical Evidence
Boom, J.T. & G.T. Svendsen (2001)
Abstract: The Kyoto Protocol allows international emissions trading, which could take place in three different forms: government, permit, or credit trading. Which trading system is chosen is likely to depend on the preferences of several interest groups. In this paper, we give empirical evidence on the preferences of industry and environmental organizations for national environmental policy instrument and for international emissions trading scheme. Furthermore, we present data that gives an indication about the level of rent-seeking by these groups at the international level. The aim of this paper is to identify which instruments are politically most feasible.
Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy
Arquilla, J. & D. Ronfeldt (eds) (2001)
Summary: The fight for the future is not between the armies of leading states, nor are its weapons those of traditional armed forces. Rather, the combatants come from bomb-making terrorist groups like Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, or drug smuggling cartels like those in Colombia and Mexico. On the positive side are civil-society activists fighting for the environment, democracy and human rights. What all have in common is that they operate in small, dispersed units that can deploy anywhere, anytime to penetrate and disrupt. They all feature network forms of organization, doctrine, strategy, and technology attuned to the information age. And, from the Intifadah to the drug war, they are proving very hard to beat.
The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties
Scotchmer, S. (2002)
World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability
Chua, A. (2002)
Do Rich Countries Choose Better Governments?
Azariadis, C. & A. Lahiri (2002)
Annexation or Conquest? The Economics of Empire Building
Grossman, H. (2002)
Belief in a Just World and Redistributive Politics
Tirole, J. & R. Benabou (2002)
Abstract: This paper develops a joint theory of ideology and redistributive policy to account for the striking divergence found across countries in voters? attitudes about the causes of individual wealth and poverty (self-reliance or societal forces), as well as in the observed social contract (laissez-faire or welfare-state). In particular, the model sheds light on how expectations of high mobility are sustained (the ?American Dream?) and dampen the demand for redistribution. In so doing, it draws on studies by sociologists and psychologists that document the cognitive efforts often required to maintain, and pass on to one?s children, the view that hard work and sacrifices will ultimately bring a better life, that people get what they deserve, and deserve what they get. The paper thus offers a psychologically grounded but nonetheless rational politico-economic model of why people may feel a need to ?believe in a just world?; of why this need, and therefore the prevalence of the belief, may vary considerably across countries; and of its implications for redistributive policies and the stigma born by the poor.
Globalization and Political Geography
Etro, F. (2003)
Fifty-four Forty or Fight!
Grossman, H. (2003)
War or Peace
Cai, H. (2003)
Democracy, Ideology And Income Inequality: An Empirical Analysis
Milanovic, B., M. Gradstein & Y. Ying (2003)
Nation-Building: The Inescapable Responsibility of the World's Only Superpower
Dobbins, J. (2003)
Turbulent Waters: Cross-border Finance and International Governance
Bryant, R. (2003)
Abstract: Today's world is organized politically into nation states with sovereign national governments. But as author Ralph C. Bryant explains, the world's economic structure is outgrowing its political structure. This book's ambitious goal is no less than to outline a pragmatically sound vision for the evolution of international governance for the world economy and financial system.
Developing countries: victims or participants, their changing role in international negotiations
Page, S. (2003)
Self Enforcing Voting in International Organizations
Maggi, G. & M. Morelli (2003)
Abstract: Some international organizations are governed by unanimity rule, some others by a majority system. Still others have moved from one system to the other over time. The existing voting models, which generally assume that decisions made by voting are perfectly enforceable, have a difficult time explaining the observed variation in governance mode, and in particular the widespread occurrence of the unanimity system. We present a model whose main departure from standard voting models is that there is no external enforcement mechanism: each country is sovereign and cannot be forced to follow the collective decision, or in other words, the voting system must be self-enforcing. The model yields unanimity as the optimal system for a wide range of parameters, and delivers rich predictions on the variation in the mode of governance, both across organizations and over time.
The Political Economy of Failed Stabilization
Veiga, F.J. (2003)
A Theory of Economic Sanctions and Issue Linkage: The Roles of Preferences, Information, and Threats
Lacy, D. & E.M.S. Niou (2004)
National Sovereignty in an Interdependent World
Bagwell, K. & R.W. Staiger (2004)
International Economic Sanctions Against a Dictator
Kaempfer, W.H., A.D. Lowenberg & W. Mertens (2004)
The Size of Nations
Alesina, A. & E. Spolaore (2004)
Abstract: A groundbreaking work synthesizing economics, political science, and history argues that a cost-benefit trade-off can explain the pattern of nation size and formation.
Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field
Elman, C. & M.F. Elman (2004)
America the Virtuous: the Crisis of Democracy and the Quest for Empire
Ryn, C. (2004)
The Rules of the Global Game
Dam, K.W. (2004)
Abstract: Economic news once confined to the business pages of the newspapers now receives headline coverage, whether it involves protests in Seattle or sweatshops in Asia. As attention comes increasingly to be focused on economic policy, it becomes even more important for noneconomists to be able to make sense of the stories and the coverage. Is the Asian economy sinking or rising? What effects will a single European currency have on the U.S. economy? Kenneth W. Dam's The Rules of the Global Game provides, in clear and practical language, a framework to help readers understand and answer these types of questions. Dam first lays out what the U.S. international economic policies are and compares them to what they should be based on how they affect U.S. per capita income. With this foundation in place, Dam then develops principles that he applies to elucidating the major components of economic policy, such as foreign trade and investment, international monetary and financial systems, and current controversial issues, including intellectual property and immigration. Underlying his explanations is a belief in the importance of worldwide free trade and open markets, but also, crucially, an understanding of the political forces that shape decision making. Because economic policy is not created in a political vacuum, Dam argues, sound policymaking requires an understanding of "statecraft"the creation and use of institutions that channel the efforts of interest groups and political forces in directions that encourage good economic outcomes. A rare book that can be read with pleasure and profit by layperson and economist alike, The Rules of the Global Game allows readers to get beyond the headlines to understand the policies that shape our economy and thus our lives.
On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union
Barbera, S. & M.O. Jackson (2004)
Macro vs. Micro-Level Perspectives on Economic Voting: Is the Micro-Level Evidence Endogenously Induced?
Erikson, R.S. (2004)
Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, With an Application to Britains "Age of Reform"
Lizzeri, A. & N. Persico (2004)
Economic and Political Liberalizations | Published
Giavazzi, F. & G. Tabellini (2004/2005)
Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of Production
Scheve, K. & M.J. Slaughter (2004)
Rule of Law, Democracy, Openness, and Income: Estimating the Interrelationships
Rigobon, R. & D. Rodrik (2004)
EU Enlargement and Anti-Globalization: New Paradox or Old Paradigm
Finel-Honigman, I. (2004)
Globalization, Comparative Advantage, and Europe's Double Competitive Squeeze
Salvatore, D. (2004)
The Future of Global Governance
Stiglitz, J.E. (2004)
Institutions and the External Capital Structure of Countries
Faria, A. & P. Mauro (2004)
The Size of the Shadow Economies of 145 Countries all over the World: First Results over the Period 1999 to 2003
Schneider, F. (2004)
Growth, History and Institutions
Bertocchi, G. (2004)
Who Runs the IFIs?
Faini, R. & E. Grilli (2004)
Economic Theories of Political (Dis)integration
REVIEW PAPER
Ruta, M. (2005)
Rationality, Ethnicity And Institutions: A Survey Of Issues And Results
REVIEW PAPER
Kyriacou, A.P. (2005)
The Coming Democracy: New Rules for Running a New World
Florini, A. (2005)
A Political Economy Approach to the Neoclassical Gradualist Model of Transition
Marangos, J. (2005)
Geopolitical interests and preferential access to U.S. markets
Lederman, D. & C. Ozden (2005)
War, peace, and the size of countries
Alesina, A. & E. Spolaore (2005)
Democratization and Clientelism: Why Are Young Democracies Badly Governed?
Keefer, P. (2005)
Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996–2004
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay & M. Mastruzzi (2005)
Abstract: This paper presents the latest update of our estimates of six dimensions of governance covering 209 countries and territories for five time periods: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004. These indicators are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 37 separate data sources constructed by 31 different organizations. We assign these individual measures of governance to categories capturing key dimensions of governance, and use an unobserved component model to construct six aggregate governance indicators in each of the four periods. We present the point estimates of the dimensions of governance as well as the margins of error for each country for the four periods. These margins of error are not unique to perceptions-based measures of governance, but are an important feature of all efforts to measure governance, including objective indicators. In fact, we provide examples of how individual objective measures provide an incomplete picture of even the quite particular dimensions of governance that they are intended to measure. We also analyze in some detail changes over time in our estimates of governance; provide a framework for assessing the statistical significance of changes in governance; and suggest a simple rule of thumb for identifying statistically significant changes in country governance over time. The ability to identify significant changes in governance over time is much higher for our aggregate indicators than for any individual indicator. While we find that the quality of governance in a number of countries has changed significantly (in both directions), we also provide evidence suggesting that there are no trends, for better or worse, in global averages of governance. Finally, we interpret the strong observed correlation between income and governance, and argue against recent efforts to apply a discount to governance performance in low income countries.
The Global Economic System since 1945
Allen, L. (2005)
A Theory of Political Cycles
Martinez, L. (2005)
On the Political Economy of Adverse Selection
Cres, H. & M. Tvede (2005)
Globalization and the Strengthening of Democracy in the Developing World
Rudra, N. (2005)
Economic Globalization and Civil War
Barbieri, K. & R. Reuveny (2005)
A Theory of Brinkmanship, Conflicts, and Commitments
Schwarz, M. & K. Sonin (2005)
Conflict, defense spending, and the number of nations
Alesina, A. & E. Spolaore (2005)
The Market for Protection and the Origin of the State
Konrad, K.A. & S. Skaperdas (2005)
Which Countries Have State Religions?
Barro, R.J. & R.M. McCleary (2005)
Life After Kyoto: Alternative Approaches to Global Warming
Shimer, R. (2005)
Measuring Risk: Political Risk Insurance Premiums and Domestic Political Institutions
Jensen, N.M. (2005)
Re-Election Incentives and the Sustainability of International Cooperation
Conconi, P. & N. Sahuguet (2006)
Geographic Proximity, Trade and International Conflict/Cooperation
Robst, J., S. Polachek & Y-C. Chang (2006)
IMF and economic growth: The effects of programs, loans, and compliance with conditionality
Dreher, A. (2006)
The political advantage of soft budget constraints
Desaia, R.J. & A. Olofsgård (2006)
Does quality of openness affect corruption?
Gokcekus, O. & J. Knörich (2006)
Artificial States
Alesina, A.F., W. Easterly & J. Matuszeski (2006)
The Global Impact of Demographic Change
Batini, N., T. Callen & W.J. McKibbin (2006)
Terrorism as Economic Warfare
Lutz, J.M. & B.J. Lutz (2006)
Does the World Economy Swing National Elections?
Leigh, A. (2006)
Trust in International Organizations: An Empirical Investigation Focusing on the United Nations
Torgler, B. (2006)
On the measurement of political instability and its impact on economic growth
Jong-A-Pin, R. (2006)
Globalization and Democracy
Eichengreen, B. & D. Leblang (2006)
Corruption, competition and democracy
Emerson, P.M. (2006)
How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations
Kuziemko, I. & E. Werker (2006)
Democracy and Foreign Education
Spilmbergo, A. (2006)
Governance Matters VI: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2006 | Data
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay & M.
Mastruzzi (2007)
Abstract: This paper reports on the latest update of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) research project covering 212 countries and territories and measuring six dimensions of governance between 1996 and 2006: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. This latest set of aggregate indicators are based on hundreds of specific and disaggregated individual variables measuring various dimensions of governance taken from 33 data sources provided by 30 different organizations. The data reflect the views on governance of public sector, private sector, and nongovernmental organization experts, as well as thousands of citizen and firm survey respondents worldwide. The paper also explicitly reports the margins of error accompanying each country estimate. These reflect the inherent difficulties in measuring governanc e using any kind of data. It finds that even after taking margins of error into account, the WGI permit meaningful cross-country comparisons, as well as monitoring progress over time. In less than a decade, a substantial number of countries exhibit statistically significant improvements in at least one dimension of governance, while other countries exhibit deterioration in some dimensions. The decade-long aggregate indicators, together with the disaggregated individual indicators, are available in a newly-redesigned website at www.govindicators.org.
Gradualism and Uncertainty in International Union Formation
Konstantinidis, N. (2007)
Governance indicators: where are we, where should we be going?
Kraay, A. & D. Kaufmann (2007)
Why is Economic Policy Different in New Democracies? Affecting Attitudes About Democracy
Brender, A. & A. Drazen (2007)
World on Fire? Democracy, Globalization and Ethnic Violence
Bezemer, D. & R. Jong-A-Pin (2007)
Democracy and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis
Doucouliagos, H. & M.A. Ulubasoglu (2008)
Political Entry, Public Policies, and the Economy
Mulligan, C.B. & K.K. Tsui (2008)
Modern Political Economy: Old Questions, New Answers
Banks, J.S. & E.A. Hanushek (eds) (1995)
Economic Politics: The Costs of Democracy
Keech, W.R. (1995)
Three Brief Proofs of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem | Published
Geanakoplos, J. (1996/2005)
Abstract: Arrow's original proof of his impossibility theorem proceeded in two steps: showing the existence of a decisive voter, and then showing that a decisive voter is a dictator. Barbera replaced the decisive voter with the weaker notion of a pivotal voter, thereby shortening the first step, but complicating the second step. I give three brief proofs, all of which turn on replacing the decisive/pivotal voter with an extremely pivotal voter (a voter who by unilaterally changing his vote can move some alternative from the bottom of the social ranking to the top), thereby simplifying both steps in Arrowrsquos proof. My first proof is the most straightforward, and the second uses Condorcet preferences (which are transformed into each other by moving the bottom alternative to the top). The third proof proceeds by reinterpreting Step 1 of the first proof as saying that all social decisions are made the same way (neutrality).
Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy
Alesina, A. & N. Roubini (1997)
Abstract: The relationship between political and economic cycles is one of the most widely studied topics in political economics. This book examines how electoral laws, the timing of elections, the ideological orientation of governments, and the nature of competition between political