Research Papers:

International Political Economy


Political Economy of Trade

What does the Political Economy Literature on Trade Policy (Not) Tell Us That We Ought to Know?
Rodrik, D. (1994)

Protection for Sale   Recommended!   JSTOR Required
Grossman, G. & E. Helpman (1994)
Abstract: We develop a model in which special interest groups make political contributions in order to influence an incumbent government's choice of trade policy. In the political equilibrium, the interest groups bid for protection, and each group's offer is optimal given the offers of the others. The politicians maximize their own welfare, which depends on the total amount of contributions collected and on the aggregate welfare of voters. We study the structure of protection that emerges in political equilibrium and the equilibrium contributions that are made by the different industry lobby groups, and show why these groups may in some cases prefer to have the government use trade policy to transfer income rather than more efficient means. We also discuss how our framework might be extended to include endogenous formation of lobby groups, political competition between incumbents and challengers, and political outcomes in a multicountry trading system.

Trade Wars & Trade Talks   Recommended!   JSTOR Required
Grossman, G. & E. Helpman (1995)
Abstract: When governments meet in the international arena, their actions reflect the political situations at home. Previous studies of trade relations have focused on governments that are immune from political pressures and that act as benevolent servants of the public interest. Here the authors introduce domestic politics into the analysis of international economic relations. They study the interactions between national leaders who are concerned with both providing a high standard of living to the general electorate and collecting campaign contributions from special-interest groups. The authors' analysis sheds light on the determinants of the structure of protection in noncooperative and cooperative policy equilibria.

Political Economy And International Economics   COLLECTED ESSAYS
Bhagwati, J. (1996)

The Economics And Politics Of Uniform Tariffs   Acrobat Required
Panagariya, A. (1996)

Political Economy And International Economics   Recommended!
Bhagwati, J. (D.A. Irwin, Editor) (1996)
Abstract: Political Economy and International Economics is the fifth volume of collected essays by the noted economist Jagdish Bhagwati. Following Essays in International Economic Theory (edited by Robert Feenstra) and Essays in Development Economics (edited by Gene Grossman), it reflects Bhagwati's wide range of interests and his rare ability to combine economic theory and political analysis.

The Political Economy of Trade Protection   Recommended!   CONFERENCE VOLUME
Krueger, A.O. (1996)
Abstract: This clear, concise summary of the in-depth analyses presented in The Political Economy of American Trade Policy examines the level, form, and evolution of American trade protection. In case studies of trade barriers imposed during the 1980s to help the steel, semiconductor, automobile, lumber, wheat, and textile and apparel industries, the contributors trace the evolution of efforts to obtain protection, protectionist measures, and their results. A chapter assessing the common themes that emerge from the studies concludes that the focus of current trade law is exclusively on the individual protection-seeking industries, with little regard for indirect effects on using industries or for consumers. Reform could usefully take these effects into account.

Trade, Democracy and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness   Acrobat Required
Boix, C. & A. Adserà (2000)

Did the Multi-fiber Agreement Make the NAFTA Politically More Acceptable? A Theoretical Analysis   Acrobat Required
Panagariya, A. & R.D. Gupta (2000)

Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policy: Menu Auctions with Imperfect Competition   Acrobat Required
Fung, K.C. & C. Lin (2000)

Voter Reactions Towards EMU: Did Foreign Trade Sensitivity Matter?
Thurner, P.W., A. Eymann & F.U. Pappi (2000)

Reciprocity and International Trade Politics: Lessons from the GATS
Crystal, J. (2000)

The USTR and Section 301: Strategic Unilateralism
Drope, J. (2000)

Trade Labour Link A Post Seattle Analysis   Acrobat Required
Panagariya, A. (2001)

Preferential Trade Liberalization: The Traditional Theory and New Developments   Acrobat Required
Panagariya, A. (2001)

Free Trade Areas and Rules of Origin: Economics and Politics   Acrobat Required
Panagariya, A. & R.D. Gupta (2001)

Multi-Issue Bargaining and Linked Agendas: Ricardo Revisited or No Pain No Gain   Recommended!
Horstmann, I.J., J.R. Markusen & J. Robles (2001)
Abstract: There has been much discussion about what issues should be included in international 'trade' negotiations. Different countries, firms and activists groups have quite different views regarding which items should (or should not) be negotiated together. Proposals run the gamut from no linking to linking trade with investment, the environment, labor and human-rights codes. This paper provides a formal framework for analyzing these questions. It employs a two-country, two-issue bargaining model and contrasts outcomes when issues are negotiated separately and when they are linked in some form. A key concept is 'comparative interest', analogous to Ricardian comparative advantage. We provide general results and note, in particular, where a country can benefit by agreeing to include an agenda item for which, when viewed by itself, the country does not receive a positive payoff.

On Modes of Economic Governance   Recommended!
Dixit, A.K. (2001)
Abstract: I consider transactions involving asymmetric prisoners’ dilemmas between pairs of players selected chosen from two large populations. Games are played repeatedly, but information about cheating is not adequate to sustain cooperation, and there is no official legal system of contract enforcement. I examine how profit-maximizing private intermediation can supply the information and enforcement. I obtain conditions under which private governance can improve upon no governance, and examine why it fails to achieve social optimality.

Trade Integration & Political Turbulence: Environmental Policy Consequences
Fredriksson, P.G. & M. Mani (2001)

Strategic Trade Policy, the 'Committed' versus 'Non-Committed' Government, and R&D Spillovers   Adobe Acrobat Required!
Zigic, K. (2001)

A Theory of Unilateral Trade Policy   Adobe Acrobat Required!
Wang, L. (2001)

Abstract: We integrate strategic-trade and political-economy considerations in a unified framework to analyze unilateral trade policy. Foreign firms compete on Home´s market through export or foreign direct investment (FDI). They also lobby Home´s government which sets trade (tariff) and industrial (tax) policies to maximize a weighted sum of domestic welfare and lobby contributions. We show that protection by a low-cost Home may improve global welfare by inducing a more cost-efficient global production pattern. The strategic-trade motive for unilateral intervention to increase domestic welfare may prevail even without domestic firms, and may be enhanced by the presence of FDI firms. The political motive to induce lobby contributions may mitigate or even reverse strategic-trade motivated policy deviations, and trade policy deviation need not benefit special interests to be politically optimal. If the government cares more about lobby contributions than about domestic welfare, it is more likely to adopt a liberal rather than a protectionist trade policy, regardless of its impact on lobbies.

Economic protectionism   Adobe Acrobat Required!
Lee, D.R (2002)

Capital Movements and the Political Economy of Trade Policy Adobe Acrobat Required
Neto, D. (2002)

'Steeling' House Votes at Low Prices for the Steel Import Quota Bill of 1999   Adobe Acrobat Required
Fisher, R.C., O. Gokcekus & E. Tower (2003)

Why Corporate Taxes May Rise: The Case of Trade Liberalization and Foreign Ownership Adobe Acrobat Required
Kind, H.J., M. Karen-Helene & G. Schjelderup (2003)

Reciprocated Unilateralism in Trade Policy: An Interest-Group Approach | Published   ScienceDirect Required
Krishna, P. & D. Mitra (2003)

Spaghetti Regionalism or Strategic Foreign Trade: Some Evidence for Mexico
Ibarra-Yunez, A. (2003)

Why the Rush to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries   Adobe Acrobat Required
Milner, H. & K. Kubota (2003)

Endogenous tariffs and trade adjustment assistance   ScienceDirect Required
Magee, C. (2003)

Sweetening the Pot: How American Sugar Buys Protection
Gokcekus, O., J. Knowles & E. Tower (2003)

Trade, Wages and the Political Economy of Trade Protection: Evidence from the Colombian Trade Reforms | Published   ScienceDirect Required
Goldberg, P. & N. Pavcnik (2003/2005)

The Value of Multilateral Trade Liberalization and the Need for Third-Party Sanction
Chen, K.P., C.Z. Qin & L. Qiu (2003)

Foreign direct investment, economic freedom and growth: new evidence from Latin America   ScienceDirect Required
Bengoa, M. & B. Sanchez-Robles (2003)

Time-consistent protection with learning by doing   ScienceDirect Required
Miravete, E.J. (2003)

The Geography of Intra-Industry Trade: empirics
Venables, A.J., P.G. Rice & M. Stewart (2003)

Protection and the Business Cycle
Bagwell, K. & R.W. Staiger (2003)

Labor Versus Capital in Trade-Policy Determination: The Role of General-Interest and Special-Interest Politics
Dutt, P. & D. Mitra (2003)

Free Trade Areas and Rules of Origin: Economics and Politics
Duttagupta, R. & A. Panagariya (2003)

Which Country Sets the Tariff? The Political Economy of Tariff Determination in the European Community   Adobe Acrobat Required
Tavares, S.C. (2003)

Setting the Common Customs Tariff: Does the EU Act as a Country or as a Group of Countries?   Adobe Acrobat Required
Tavares, S.C. (2003)

Explaining Changes in the EU’s Customs Classification: New Products or Political Economy?   Adobe Acrobat Required
Tavares, S.C. (2003)

Unanticipated Delays: A Unified Model of Position Timing and Position Content   Adobe Acrobat Required
Boehmke, F.J. (2003)

The Political Economy of Litigation and Settlement at the WTO   Adobe Acrobat Required
Guzman, A. (2003)

The Political Economy of Restructuring and Subsidisation: An International Perspective   Adobe Acrobat Required
Everaert, G. (2003)

Foreign Lobbies and US Trade Policy
Gawande, K., P. Krishna & M.J. Robbins (2004)

A quantification of policy reform: an application to the Uruguay Round Negotiations on Agriculture   ScienceDirect Required
Redmond, W.J. (2004)

Free Trade, Reciprocity and Protectionism   Recommended!
Witzel, M. (2004)

Abstract: Who supports free trade over protectionism? A hundred years ago, it was the political right that favored free trade while the left was largely protectionist. This set shows how--despite drastic changes over the years--the basic parameters of this argument remain. The volumes include works by passionate supporters and opponents of protectionism as well as more neutral observations on the merits of each.

India's Trade Policy For Sale: How Much? Who Buys?   Recommended!
Cadot, O., J-M. Grether & M. Olarreaga (2003)

Abstract: This paper proposes a new method to test the Grossman-Helpman model of endogenous protection and lobby formation. This method, which does not require outside data on lobbies or contributions, identifies politically organized industries for trade protection purposes and calculates equilibrium contributions directly from the model using structural parameter estimates. Its emphasis on vertical inter-industry linkages makes it also possible to trace the effects of duty drawbacks and counter-lobbying from downstream users on endogenous protection. Applied to India, it yields results that are qualitatively consistent with the model’s predictions and that seem quantitatively more plausible than estimates given for the US by alternative methods. The weight on social welfare in the government’s objective function is 5, and the average contribution per ISIC sector is $33 million.

Trade, Politics,and the Environment: Tailpipe vs. Smokestack   Adobe Acrobat Required
McAusland, C. (2003)

Do Labor Issues Matter In The Determination Of U.S. Trade Policy? An Empirical Reevaluation   Adobe Acrobat Required
Matschke, X. & S. Sherlund (2003)

Political Pressure Deflection   Recommended!
Anderson, J.E. & M. Zanardi (2004)

Abstract: Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes - political pressure deflection. Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to `sell' is valuable to politicians. The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger, essentially like entry deterrence. U.S. trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example, especially antidumping law and its evolution.

Political Influence in a New Antidumping Regime: Evidence from Mexico | Alternative   Adobe Acrobat Required
Francois, J.F. & G. Niels (2004)

Free Riders Among the Rent-Seekers: A Model of Firm Participation in Antidumping Petitions   Adobe Acrobat Required
Olson, K.M. (2004)

Migration flows: Political Economy of Migration and the Empirical Challenges   Adobe Acrobat Required
O'Rourke, K.H. & R. Sinnott (2004)

Labor market rigidities and the political economy of trade protection   Recommended!   Adobe Acrobat Required
Matschke, X. (2004)

Abstract: Labor market rigidities are commonly believed to be a major reason for imposing trade impediments. In this paper, I introduce labor market rigidities (such as influential trade unions and high unemployment benefits), that are prevalent in continental European countries, into the well-known Grossman and Helpman (1994) protection for sale model, which has emerged as the leading model in the political economy of trade protection literature. I show that contrary to commonly held views, these labor market rigidities do not necessarily increase equilibrium trade protection. A testable equilibrium trade protection equation is also derived. The findings in this paper are hence particularly relevant for empirical tests of trade policy determinants in economies with more regulated labor markets.

Macro Economic Determinants of Antidumping: A Comparative Analysis of Developed and Developing Countries   ScienceDirect Required
Aggarwal, A. (2004)

Terrorism and international trade: an empirical investigation   ScienceDirect Required
Nitsch, V. & D. Schumacher (2004)

Global corporations and local politics: income redistribution vs. FDI subsidies   ScienceDirect Required
Janeba, E. (2004)

The Political Economy of Trans-Pacific Business Linkages
Henisz, W. (2004)

Protection versus Promotion: An Empirical Investigation   Wiley Interscience Required
Mitra, D., D.D. Thomakos & M.A. Ulubasoglu (2004)

Four Simple Tests of Campaign Contributions and Trade Policy Preferences   Wiley Interscience Required
Beaulieu, E. & C. Magee (2004)

Political Externalities, Nondiscrimination, and a Multilateral World   Wiley Interscience Required
Ethier, W.J. (2004)

The Returns from Rent-Seeking: Campaign Contributions, Firm Subsidies, and the Byrd Amendment   Adobe Acrobat Required
Liebman, B. & K.M. Olson (2004)

Trade, Standards, and the Political Economy of Genetically Modified Food
Anderson, K., R. Damania & L.A. Jackson (2004)

From Protectionism to Regionalism: Multinational Firms and Trade-Related Investment Measures
Chase, K.A. (2004)

Negotiating Free Trade | Published   Recommended!   ScienceDirect Required
Aghion, P., P. Antras & E. Helpman (2004/07)
Abstract: We develop a dynamic bargaining model in which a leading country endogenously decides whether to sequentially negotiate free trade agreements with subsets of countries or engage in simultaneous multilateral bargaining with all countries at once. We show how the structure of coalition externalities shapes the choice between sequential and multilateral bargaining, and we identify circumstances in which the grand coalition is the equilibrium outcome, leading to worldwide free trade. A model of international trade is then used to illustrate equilibrium outcomes and how they depend on the structure of trade and protection. Global free trade is not achieved when the political-economy motive for protection is sufficiently large. Furthermore, the model generates both building bloc' and stumbling bloc' effects of preferential trade agreements. In particular, we describe an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are permitted to form (a building bloc effect), and an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are forbidden (a stumbling bloc effect). The analysis identifies conditions under which each of these outcomes emerges.

Trade, Standards, and the Political Economy of Genetically Modified Food
Anderson, K., R. Damania & L.A. Jackson (2004)

Reciprocated Unilateralism in Trade Reforms with Majority Voting | Published
Krishna, P. & D. Mitra (2004)

How Outsourcing Affects Bilateral Political Relations   Adobe Acrobat Required
Polachek, Solomon W. (2004)

Trade Still Follows the Flag: The Primacy of Politics in a Simultaneous Model of Interdependence and Armed Conflict   Wiley Interscience Required
Keshk, O.M.G., B.M. Pollins & R. Reuveny (2004)

Hormone beef, chlorinated chicken and international trade   Recommended!   ScienceDirect Required
Calzolari, G. & G. Immordino (2004)

Abstract: We study international trade in innovative goods subject to uncertain consumer health effects. Such goods are often at the center of international trade disputes. We show that an interesting form of protectionism may arise because of scientific uncertainty. A free-riding effect is identified, implying more conservative behavior by countries. We also study the role of producers (lobbies) in providing valuable information, finding that the innovative lobby has an advantage in providing information as compared with the lobby producing the ‘traditional’ good. Moreover, lobbies disclose more information when the health effects are long lasting.

Who Makes the Rules of Globalization?
Deardorff, A.V. (2004)

The Political Economy of Job Protection and Income Redistribution   Adobe Acrobat Required
Amable, B. & D. Gatti (2004)

Enforcement, Private Political Pressure and the GATT/WTO Escape Clause
Bagwell, K. & R.W. Staiger (2004)

Cultural Biases in Economic Exchange
Guiso, L., P. Sapienza & L. Zingales (2004)

A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics | Published   Ingenta Select Required
Grossman, G.M. & E. Helpman (2004/05)

Socially Responsible Trade Integration: A Political Economy Perspective
Verdier, T. (2004)

The Clash of Liberalizations: Preferential versus Multilateral Trade Liberalization in the European Union   Recommended!
Karacaoval, B. & N. Limao (2005)
Abstract: There has been an explosion in the number of preferential trade agreements in the past decade. Preferential trade agreements are characterized by liberalization with respect to only a few partners and thus they can potentially clash with and retard multilateral trade liberalization. Despite this important concern with preferential trade agreements, there is almost no systematic evidence on whether they actually affect multilateral trade liberalization. Karacaovali and Limão model the effect of preferential trade agreements on multilateral trade liberalization and show that preferential trade agreements slow down multilateral trade liberalization unless they have a common external tariff and allow for internal transfers. Next, they use detailed data on product-level tariffs negotiated by the European Union in the past two multilateral trade rounds to structurally estimate their model. The authors confirm the main prediction—the European Union’s preferential trade agreements have clashed with its multilateral trade liberalization–-and find that the effect is quantitatively significant. Moreover, they also confirm several auxiliary predictions of the model and provide new evidence on the political economy determinants of multilateral liberalization in the European Union.

Learning to Act on World Trade Preference Formation of Large Firms in the United States and the European Union   Acrobat Required
Woll, C. (2005)

The Role of Importers and Exporters in the Determination of the U.S. Tariff Preferences Granted to Latin America
Silva, P. (2005)

Trade Liberalization and the Politics of Financial Development
Braun, M. & C. Raddatz (2005)

The Globalization of Trade and Democracy, 1870-2000
Lopez-Cordova, J.E. & C.M. Meissner (2005)

Political Ideology and Endogenous Trade Policy: An Empirical Investigation   Ingenta Select Required
Dutt, P. & D. Mitra (2005)

Trade, turnover, and tithing   ScienceDirect Required
Magee, C.S.P., C. Davidson & S.J. Matusz (2005)

Protection for Sale with Imperfect Rent Capturing
Facchini, G., J. Van Biesebroeck & G. Willmann (2005)

Meta-Strategic Lobbying: The 1998 Steel Imports Case
Brook, D.A. (2005)

Lobbying Competition Over US Trade Policy
Gawande, K. & P. Krishna (2005)

Political Economy of Antidumping and Safeguards in Argentina
Nogues, J.J. & E. Baracat (2005)

American Trade Politics, 4th edition   Recommended!
Destler, I.M. (2005)
Abstract: In this comprehensive revision of the most influential, widely read analysis of the US trade policymaking system, Destler addresses how globalization has reshaped trade politics, weakening traditional protectionism but intensifying concern about trade’s societal impacts. Entirely new chapters treat the deepening of partisan divisions and the rise of “trade and . . .” issues (especially labor and the environment). The author concludes with a comprehensive economic and political strategy to cope with globalization and maximize its benefits. The original edition of American Trade Politics won the Gladys Kammerer Award of the American Political Science Association for the best book on US national policy.

Protection for sale under monopolistic competition   ScienceDirect Required
Chang, P-L. (2005)

How can the security of international trade be financed in developing countries? A global public good approach   ScienceDirect Required
Dulbecco, P. & B. Laporte (2005)

The political economy of international factor mobility   ScienceDirect Required
Facchini, G. & G. Willmann (2005)

The sources of protectionist drift in representative democracies   ScienceDirect Required
Laussel, D. & R. Riezman (2005)

Rules of Origin as Export Subsidies
Cadot, O., A. Estevadeordal & A. Suwa-Eisenmann (2005)

Rent Seeking with Politically Contestable Rights to Tariff-rate Import Quotas   Wiley Interscience Required
Hranaiova, J. & H. de Gorter (2005)

Globalization and International Conflict: Can FDI Increase Peace?   Acrobat Required
Polachek, S., C. Seiglie & J. Xiang (2005)

Trade creating free trade areas and the undermining of multilateralism   ScienceDirect Required
Ornelas, E. (2005)

The sources of protectionist drift in representative democracies   ScienceDirect Required
Laussel, D. & R. Riezman (2005)

Who Wants to Globalize? Consumer Tastes and Labor Markets in a Theory of Trade Policy Beliefs   Wiley Interscience Required
Baker, A. (2005)

Economic Policy Responses to Preference Erosion: From Trade as Aid to Aid for Trade
Hoekman, B. & S. Prouse (2005)

The Structure of Lobbying and Protection in U.S. Agriculture
Gawande, K. (2005)

A Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements
Maggi, G. & A. Rodriguez-Clare (2005)

Endogenous free trade agreements and the multilateral trading system   ScienceDirect Required
Ornelas, E. (2005)

Rent Destruction and the Political Viability of Free Trade Agreements   Ingenta Select Required
Ornelas, E. (2005)

Collateral Damage: Trade Disruption and the Economic Impact of War
Glick, R. & A.M. Taylor (2005)

Postbellum Protection and Commissioner Wells's Conversion to Free Trade   Adobe Acrobat Required
Meardon, S. (2005)

Household Inequality, Welfare, and the Setting of Trade Policy   Acrobat Required
Francois, J. & H. Rojas-Romagosa (2006)

Affinity and International Trade   Acrobat Required
Noland, M. (2005)

Voting on Tariff and Retaliation
van Ypersele, T. (2006)

Protection for Sale Made Easy
Baldwin, R. & Robert-Nicoud, F. (2006)

Trade, inequality, and the political economy of institutions | Published   Acrobat Required   ScienceDirect Required
Levchenko, A.A. & Q-T. Do (2006/09)

Political risk and capital flight   ScienceDirect Required
Le, Q.V. & P.J. Zak (2006)

Antebellum Tariff Politics: Coalition Formation and Shifting Regional Interests
Irwin, D.A. (2006)

Putting the Lid on Lobbying: Tariff Structure and Long-Term Growth when Protection is for Sale
Nunn, N. & D. Trefler (2006)

Globalisation and the Mix of Wage and Profit Taxes   Acrobat Required
Haufler, A., A. Klemm & G. Schjelderup (2006)

Democracy and Protectionism
O'Rourke, K.H. & A.M. Taylor (2006)

Protection for Sale or Surge Protection? | Published   ScienceDirect Required
Imai, S., H. Katayama & K. Krishna (2006/09)

Institutional quality and trade: Which institutions? Which trade?   Acrobat Required
Pierre-Guillaume M. & K. Sekkat (2006)

Productivity matters for trade policy : theory and evidence   Acrobat Required
Karacaovali, B. (2006)

Selling Protection for Sale   Acrobat Required
Ethier, W.J. (2006)

Democracy and globalisation | Published   Wiley Interscience Required
Eichengreen, B. & D. Leblang (2006/08)

Corruption and trade protection: evidence from panel data   Acrobat Required
Bandyopadhyay, S. & S. Roy (2006)

Food Protection for Sale   Wiley Interscience Required
Lopez, R.A. & X. Matschke (2006)

The FTAA and the political economy of protection in Brazil and the US   Acrobat Required
de Paiva Abreu, M. (2006)

Trade, Peace and Democracy: An Analysis of Dyadic Dispute   Acrobat Required
Polachek, S.W. & C. Seiglie (2006)

Competitive Proposals of Policies by Lobbies   Acrobat Required
Chaturvedi, A. & A. Glazer (2006)

The political economy of antidumping   ScienceDirect Required   SURVEY PAPER
Nelson, D. (2006)

Globalization and Domestic Conflict | Published   ScienceDirect Required   Acrobat Required
Garfinkel, M.R., S. Skaperdas & C. Syropoulos (2006/08)

Capital Movements and the Political Economy of Trade Policy
Neto, D.G. (2006)

Trade Openness and Preferences for Redistribution: A Cross-National Assessment of the Compensation Hypothesis
Ventura, L.B. (2006)

Is There a Human Right to Free Movement? Immigration and Original Ownership of the Earth
Blake, M. & M. Risse (2006)

Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocs on the Path to Global Free Trade
Baldwin, R. (2006)

Are antidumping duties for sale? case-level evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Protection for Sale Model
Evans, C.L. &. S.M. Sherlund (2006)

Market access for sale   ScienceDirect Required
Kee, H.L., M. Olarreaga & P. Silva (2006)

Political risk and export promotion: evidence from Germany
Moser, C., T. Nestmann & M. Wedow (2006)

The Political Economy of Agricultural Protection   Wiley Interscience Required
Thies, C.G. & S. Porche (2007)

Institutions, Infrastructure and Trade
Francois, J. & M. Manchin (2007)

International trade and rent sharing among developed and developing countries   ScienceDirect Required
Fontagnéa, L. & D. Mirza (2007)

Making Anarchy Work: International Legal Institutions and Trade Cooperation   Wiley Interscience Required
Kono, D.Y. (2007)

Impacts of interest groups: Endogenous interaction and lobbying limit   ScienceDirect Required
Ho, S.J. (2007)

Can compensation save free trade?   ScienceDirect Required
Davidson, C., S.J. Matusz & D.R. Nelson (2007)

Inefficient policies, inefficient institutions and trade   Acrobat Required
Segura-Cayuela, R. (2007)

Good Governance, Trade and Agglomeration   Acrobat Required
Candau, F. (2007)

Why are people more pro-trade than pro-migration?   Acrobat Required
Mayda, A.M. (2007)

Trade policy: What's welfare got to do with it?   ScienceDirect Required
Damania, R. & P.G. Fredriksson (2007)

The Role of Immigration in Sustaining the Social Security System: A Political Economy Approach   Acrobat Required
Sand, E. & A. Razin (2007)

The Politics of Wine: Trade Barriers, Interest Groups, and the Commerce Clause   Wiley Interscience Required
Wiseman, A.E. & J. Ellig (2007)

Foreign Discrimination, Protection for Exporters, and U.S. Trade Liberalization   Wiley Interscience Required
Dur, A. (2007)

A Quantile Based Test of Protection for Sale Model   Acrobat Required
Imai, S., H. Katayama & K. Krishna (2007)

Ideology, Inequality and Inequitable Trade Policies
Djerdjian, D.O. (2007)

China's WTO Entry: Antidumping, Safeguards, and Dispute Settlement
Bown, C.P. (2007)

Political Stasis or Protectionist Rut? Policy Mechanisms for Trade Reform in a Democracy   Acrobat Required
Blanchard, E. & G. Willmann (2007)

State Visits and International Trade   Adobe Acrobat Required
Nitschr, V. (2007)

The Common External Tariff in a Customs Union: Voting, Logrolling, and National Government Interests   Wiley Interscience Required
Tavares, S.C. (2007)

Capital, Trade, and the Political Economies of Reform   Wiley Interscience Required
Brooks, S.M. & M.J. Kurtz (2007)

Trade and Major Power Alliance Decisions
Fordham, B.O. (2007)

Can Openness Deter Corruption? The Role of Foreign Direct Investment
Larrain B., F. & J. Tavares (2007)

Political asymmetry and common external tariff in a customs union   Adobe Acrobat Required
Bandyopadhyay, S., S. Lahiri & S. Roy (2007)

The Political Economy of Services Trade Liberalization: A Case for International Regulatory Cooperation?
Hoekman, B., A. Mattoo & A. Sapir (2007)

Trade Policies as Signals of Private Political Pressure   Wiley Interscience Required
Sawaki, H. (2007)

The quality of institutions and foreign direct investment   Wiley Interscience Required
Daude, C. & E. Stein (2007)

Rent seeking, interest groups and environmental lobbying: Cane Farmers versus Great Barrier Reef Protectionists   Acrobat Required
Beard, R. (2007)

Equity and Trade Policy   Acrobat Required
Francois, J. & H. Rojas-Romagosa (2007)

Do rapid political and trade liberalizations increase corruption?   ScienceDirect Required
Tavares, S.C. (2007)

Why Are Market Economies Politically Stable? A Theory of Capitalist Cohesion   Acrobat Required
Dalgaard, C. & O. Olsson (2007)

Is Protection Really for Sale? A Survey and Directions for Future Research   Acrobat Required
Imai, S., H. Katayama & K. Krishna (2008)

Investment and Expropriation under Oligarchy and Democracy in a Heckscher-Ohlin World   Acrobat Required
Albornoz, F., S. Galiani & D. Heymann (2008)

The sustainable cooperative tariffs : a political economy perspective   Acrobat Required
Mehdi, R. (2008)

Regionalism or Multilateralism? A Political Economy Choice
Albertin, G. (2008)

A Swing-State Theory of Trade Protection in the Electoral College   Acrobat Required
Muuls, M. & D. Petropoulou (2008)

Bilateral Trade in the Shadow of Armed Conflict   Wiley Interscience Required
Long, A.G. (2008)

Trade, conflicts and political integration : explaining the heterogeneity of regional trade agreements   Acrobat Required
Vicard, V. (2008)

The Tariff and the Lobbyist: Political Institutions, Interest Group Politics, and U.S. Trade Policy   Wiley Interscience Required
Ehrlich, S.D. (2008)

Trade, conflicts and political integration : explaining the heterogeneity of regional trade agreements   Acrobat Required
Vicard, V. (2008)

Firm heterogeneity and lobby participation   ScienceDirect Required
Bombardini, M. (2008)

Make Trade Not War?   Wiley Interscience Required
Martin, P., T. Mayer & M. Thoenig (2008)

A Simple Model of the Juggernaut Effect of Trade Liberalisation   Acrobat Required
Baldwin, R.E. & F. Robert-Nicoud (2008)

Foreign Influence and Welfare
Antràs, P. & G. Padró i Miquel (2008)

Do Interest Groups Affect US Immigration Policy?
Facchini, G., A.M. Mayda & P. Mishra (2008)

For Sale: Trade Policy in Majoritarian Systems   Acrobat Required
Fredriksson, P.G., X. Matschke & J. Minier (2008)

Contributing or Free-Riding? A Theory of Endogenous Lobby Formation   Acrobat Required
Konishi, H. & T. Furusawa (2008)

The Political Economy of the 2003 Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy   Acrobat Required
Swinnen, J.F.M. (2008)

Trade and Empire
Mitchener, K.J. & M. Weidenmier (2008)

Fast Track Authority and International trade Negotiations
Conconi, P., G. Facchini & M. Zanardi (2008)

Are Crises Good for Long-Term Growth? The Role of Political Institutions   Acrobat Required
Cavallo, A.F. & E.A. Cavallo (2008)

Trade, conflicts and political integration : explaining the heterogeneity of regional trade agreements   Acrobat Required
Vicard, V. (2008)

Endogenous Protection in General Equilibrium: estimating political weights in the EU   Acrobat Required
Francois, J.F., D. Nelson & A. Pelkmans-Balaoing (2008)

The sustainable cooperative tariffs: a political economy perspective   Acrobat Required
Mehdi, R. (2008)

Live or let die: intra-sectoral lobbying on entry   Acrobat Required
Rebeyrol, V. & J. Vauday (2008)

Judicialization Matters! A Comparison of Dispute Settlement Under GATT and the WTO   Wiley Interscience Required
Zangl, B. (2008)

Trade policy of a free trade agreement in the presence of foreign lobbying   ScienceDirect Required
Stoyanov, A. (2008)

Sleeping With Your Friends' Enemies: An Explanation of Sanctions-Busting Trade   Wiley Interscience Required
Early, B.R. (2009)

Competition and Political Organization: Together or Alone in Lobbying for Trade Policy?
Bombardini, M. & F. Trebbi (2009)

Assessing the impact of political economy factors on rules of origin under NAFTA
Portugal-Perez, A. (2009)

Trade, Development, and the Political Economy of Public Standards   Acrobat Required
Swinnen, J.F.M. & T. Vandemoortele (2009)

What Governments Maximize and Why: The View from Trade
Gawande, K., P. Krishna & M. Olarreaga (2009)

Shopping for Protection: The Politics of Choosing Trade Instruments in a Partially Legalized World   Wiley Interscience Required
Naoi, M. (2009)

Constituent Influence on International Trade Policy in the United States, 1987–2006   Wiley Interscience Required
Jeong, G-H. (2009)

A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics: An Empirical Investigation   Wiley Interscience Required
Evans, C.L. (2009)

Trade Openness, Institutional Change and Economic Growth   Acrobat Required
Navas-Ruiz, A. (2009)

Political Economy of Agricultural Distortions:The Literature to Date   SURVEY PAPER
Swinnen, J.F.M. (2009)

The Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policies   Wiley Interscience Required
Fung, K.C., C.C. Lin & R-Y. Chang

Globalization: Country and company interests in conflict   ScienceDirect Required
Gomory, R. & W.J. Baumol (2009)

Developing Countries and the World Trade Organization: A Foreign Influence Approach   Acrobat Required
García-Herrero, A., A. Siu & K.C. Fung (2009)

Cross-border lobbying in preferential trading agreements: implications for external tariffs   Acrobat Required
Bandyopadhyay, S., S. Lahiri & H.J. Wall (2009)

Speed Money: Time, Corruption, and Trade   Acrobat Required
Shepherd, B. (2009)

Trade, democracy, and the gravity equation   ScienceDirect Required
Yu, M. (2009)

The role of macroeconomic performance in individual’s attitudes towards protectionism   Acrobat Required
Melgar, N., J. Milgram & M. Rossi (2009)

Globalization, rent protection institutions, and going alone in freeing trade   ScienceDirect Required
Grieben, W-H. & F. Sener (2009)

Market Structure, Electoral Institutions, and Trade Policy   Wiley Interscience Required
Kono, D.Y. (2009)

Trade and Thy Neighbor's War
Qureshi, M.S. (2009)

Envy, Altruism, and the International Distribution of Trade Protection
Lue, X., K.F. Scheve & M.J. Slaughter (2010)

Political Limits to Globalization
Acemoglu, D. & P. Yared (2010)

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Political Economy of International Finance

Domestic Responses to Free Trade and Free Finance in OECD Economies   Acrobat Required
Verdier, D. (1998)

The Political Economy of European Exchange Rates: An Empirical Assessment
Frieden, J. (1998)

Political Contagion in Currency Crises
Drazen, A. (1999)

The Negotiation Process and International Economic Organizations   
Odell, J. (1999)

The Politics of Speculative Attacks in Industrial Democracies   Acrobat Required
Leblang, D. & Bernhard, W. (1999)

From the Exchange Stabilisation Fund to the International Monetary Fund   Acrobat Required
Bordo, M. (2000)

Defending or Devaluing: The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy   Acrobat Required
Leblang, D. (2000)

Agency and Delegation in IMF Conditionality   Acrobat Required
Martin, L. (2000)

Risk and Reward: Agency, Contracts, and the Expansion of IMF Conditionality   Acrobat Required
Kapur, D. (2000)

Private Capital, Central Banks, and International Monetary Governance: A Necessary Connection?   Acrobat Required
Kahler, M. (2000)

The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 20th Century
Rajan, R.G. & L. Zingales (2001)

Competing and Complementary Explanations of Monetary Regime Choice
Clark, W.R. (2000)

Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes   Acrobat Required
Broz, J.L. (2000)

Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments
Keefer, P. & D. Stasavage (2000)

Multiple Hands on the Wheel: Exchange-Rate Regimes, International Financial Exposure, Central Bank Autonomy, and Inflation in the Open Economy   Acrobat Required
Franzese Jr., R.J. (2000)

Who Recovers First? Banking Crisis Resolution in Developing Countries
Montinola, G. (2000)

Currency Instability and Government Change
Chang, M. (2000)

Comparative Context and Public Preferences over Regional Economic Integration
Scheve, K. (2000)

Merging East and West: How Eastern Europeans Form Opinions About Economic Integration into the European Union
Anderson, C.J. & Y.V. Tverdova (2000)

Political Processes and Foreign Exchange Markets   Acrobat Required
Bernhard, W. & D. Leblang (2000)

Some Political Economy Aspects of EMU   Acrobat Required
Willett, T.D. (2000)

The Political Economy of External Discipline: Constraint Versus Incentive Effects of Capital Mobility and Exchange Rate Pegs   Acrobat Required
Willett, T.D. (2001)

The Political Economy of International Unions | Published   Ingenta Select Required
Alesina, A., I. Angeloni & F. Etro (2001/2005)

Politics and the Determinants of Banking Crises: the Effects of Political Checks and Balances   Acrobat Required
Keefer, P. (2002)

Fear of Floating Needn't Imply Fixed Rates: Feasible Options for Intermediate Exchange Rate Regimes   Adobe Acrobat Required!
Willett, T.D. (2002)

The Political Economy of Perverse Financial Liberalization: Examples from the Asian Crisis   Acrobat Required
Willett, T.D. & N.N. Auerbach (2002)

Critical Realism and the Political Economy of the Euro
Arestis, P., A. Brown & M. Sawyer (2002)

Implications of EMU Enlargement for European Monetary Policy: A Political Economy View Adobe Acrobat Required
Maier, P. & M. Hendrikx (2002)

A Political-Economic Model of the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime
Sun, Y. (2002)

Political Economy of Oil-Revenue Sharing in a Developing Country: Illustrations from Nigeria
Ahmad, E. & R. Singh (2003)

The Political Economy of EU Enlargement: Lessons from Switzerland   Acrobat Required
de Melo, J., M. Florence & T. Müller (2003)

Financial Infrastructure, Group Interests and Capital Accumulation   Acrobat Required
Bossone, b., s. Mahajan & F. Zahir (2003)

Political Relationships, Global Financing and Corporate Transparency   Acrobat Required
Leuz, C. & F. Oberholzer-Gee (2003)

The Political Economy of Capital Income and Profit Taxation in a Small Open Economy   Acrobat Required
Huizinga, H. & S.B. Nielsen

Lobbying by Ethnic Groups and Aid Allocation   Acrobat Required
Lahiri, S. & P. Raimondos-Møller (2003)

The Politics of Foreign Aid   Acrobat Required
Mayer, W. & P. Raimondos-Møller (2003)

The Monetary Geography of Africa   Recommended!
Masson, P. & C. Pattillo (2003)
Abstract: This book describes the use of moneys in Africa, currently and in the recent past, and attempts to draw conclusions concerning the evolution of exchange rate regimes in the future. Before getting into the substance, two questions need to be answered: what is the meaning of "monetary geography," and why is it an interesting topic for Africa? We have adapted the term "monetary geography" from the title of a book by Benjamin Cohen, The Geography of Money. In that book, Cohen argues forcefully that money has become "deterritorialized," that is, the circulation of a particular money is no longer coterminous with the country of issue. A prime case in point is the creation of the euro, which is not associated with a single country but rather with a supranational central bank. In addition, foreign currencies circulate widely in many developing countries, because of uncertainty about the ability of the domestic currency to maintain its value. Thus, in this book, we are concerned with the use of money, whether within the issuing country's borders or outside of them. We are especially interested in the potential spread of regional currency areas. In keeping with the geographical notion, we will rely on maps to convey some of the key data not only on the use of moneys but also on the economic variables that influence their use and determine the value of money. This brings us to the second question: why is that an interesting topic in Africa today? In fact, Africa is arguably a more useful laboratory for studying the use of money than is Europe. It contains two monetary unions characterized by joint decision-making among sovereign states that have existed for some 40 years, the two CFA franc zones, and a monetary area between South Africa and smaller neighboring countries, in which South Africa sets monetary policy, that dates back to the early years of the 20th century. This justifies a more thorough look at the African experience than has been attempted thus far, in notable contrast to the European case, which has received enormous attention. Moreover, the African continent has several projects for further monetary unions that are intended to culminate in a single African currency. So there is a great need for analysis of the advisability of the monetary union projects and for research into how best to proceed. We hope that this book goes some way towards meeting those needs.

Political conditions and currency crises in emerging markets   ScienceDirect Required
Block, S.A. (2003)

IMF arrangements, politics and the timing of stabilizations
Veiga, F.J. (2003)

Globalization and the Politics of International Finance: The Stiglitz Verdict   Ingenta Select Required   SURVEY PAPER
Basu, K. (2003)

Democratization’s Risk Premium: Partisan and Opportunistic Political Business Cycle Effects on Sovereign Ratings in Developing Countries   Adobe Acrobat Required
Block, S., B.N. Schrage & P.M. Vaaler (2003)

The Political-Economy of Argentina’s Debacle   Adobe Acrobat Required
Buscaglia, M.A. (2003)

Endogenous Financial Openness: Efficiency and Political Economy Considerations
Aizenman, J. & I. Noy (2003)

Does Foreign Aid Promote the Expansion of Government?   Wiley Interscience Required
Remmer, K.L. (2003)

The Political Economy of Unconditional and Conditional Foreign Assistance: Grants vs. Loan Rollovers   Adobe Acrobat Required
Mayer, W. (2004)

The Influence of IMF Programs on the Re-election of Debtor Governments   Wiley Interscience Required
Dreher, A. (2004)

The Power of Money: Global Capital and Policy Choices in Developing Countries   Wiley Interscience Required
Shambaugh, G.E. (2004)

The European Union: A Politically Incorrect View
Alesina, A. & R. Perotti (2004)

Political Competition and Economic Growth: Lessons from the Political Economy of Banking in Mexico and the United States   Adobe Acrobat Required
Haber, S. (2004)

The Political Economy of Conditional and Unconditional Foreign Assistance: Grants vs. Loan Rollovers
Mourmouras, A.T. & W. Mayer (2004)

A Failure Story: Politics and Financial Liberalization in Turkey, Revisiting the Revolving Door Hypothesis   ScienceDirect Required
Demir, F. (2004)

Exchange Rate Variability and Lobbies
Goncalves, C.E.S. (2004)

The Politics of Economic Reform in Thailand: Crisis and Compromise   Adobe Acrobat Required
Hicken, A. (2004)

One Country, One Vote? Labor Market Structure and Voting Rights in the ECB   Adobe Acrobat Required
Berger, H. & C. Hefeker (2004)

Elections and the timing of devaluations   Recommended!   ScienceDirect Required
Stein, E.H. & J.M. Streb (2004)
Abstract: This paper presents a rational political budget cycle model where devaluation acts as a tax on consumption due to a cash-in-advance constraint. Competent governments can signal their competency by reducing the rate of devaluation prior to elections. When voters also ignore the degree to which governments are opportunistic, i.e. the extent to which they are willing to distort the economy for electoral gain, an incompetent, opportunistic incumbent can reduce the rate of devaluation in the run-up to an election. The main theoretical implication in either setup, that the rate of devaluation is significantly higher in the months following an election, is consistent with evidence drawn from 26 countries in Latin America.

Redistribution to Rent Seekers, Foreign Aid and Economic Growth   Adobe Acrobat Required
Hodler, R. (2004)

Regional Integration and Third-Country Inward Investment
Markusen, J. (2004)

The Political Economy of Deposit Insurance
Laeven, L. (2004)

Money-Based Versus Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilization: Is There Space for Political Opportunism? | Published
Aisen, A. (2004/07)

The Quality of Foreign Aid: Country Selectivity or Donors Incentives?
Wane, W. (2004)

Direct Investment, Rising Real Wages and the Absorption of Excess Labor in the Periphery
Dooley, M.P., D. Folkerts-Landau & P. Garber (2004)

The price of democracy: sovereign risk ratings, bond spreads and political business cycles in developing countries   ScienceDirect Required
Block, S.A. & P.M. Vaaler (2004)

On US politics and IMF Lending   Adobe Acrobat Required
Andersen, T.B., T. Harr & F. Tarp (2004)

Political support to public debt repudiation in a Monetary Union - the role of the geographical allocation of debt   Adobe Acrobat Required
Di Gioacchino, D., S. Ginebri & L. Sabani (2004)

Unions and the political economy of immigration   Adobe Acrobat Required
Ceroni, C.B. & G. Bellettini (2004)

Capital Controls: a Political Economy Approach   Wiley Interscience Required
Alfaro, L. (2004)

The Economic and Politics Determinants of IMF and World Bank Lending in the Middle East and North Africa   Adobe Acrobat Required
Harrigan, J., C. Wang & H. El-Said (2004)

Corruption and public finance: an IMF perspective   ScienceDirect Required
Hillman, A.L. (2004)

On the Political Economy of Immigration and Income Redistribution   Wiley Interscience Required
Dolmas, J. & G.W. Huffman (2004)

International Capital Mobility and Trade Politics: Capital Flows, Political Coalitions, and Lobbying   Wiley Interscience Required
Hiscox, M.J. (2004)

Elections, Special Interests, and the Fiscal Costs of Financial Crisis
Keefer, P. (2004)

Can Public Discussion Enhance Program Ownership?
Drazen, A. & P. Isard (2004)

The political economy of east Asian economic integration   ScienceDirect Required
Tourk, K. (2004)

How Should Large and Small Countries Be Represented in a Currency Union?   Acrobat Required
Berger. H. & T. Mueller (2004)

The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision   Acrobat Required
Widgren, M. & S. Napel (2004)

Dollarization and political risk: Is there a forum for debate?   ScienceDirect Required
Arbeláez, H. (2005)

How Do Political Changes Influence U.S. Bilateral Aid Allocations? Evidence from Panel Data   Acrobat Required
Fleck, R.K. & C. Kilby (2005)

EU Fiscal Rules: Issues and Lessons from Political Economy   Acrobat Required
Schuknecht, L. (2004)

Congressional Politics of International Financial Rescues   Wiley Interscience Required
Broz, J.L. (2005)

Global Aging and Fiscal Policy with International Labor Mobility: A Political Economy Perspective
Tosun, M.S. (2005)

Bank Supervision and Corruption in Lending | Published   ScienceDirect Required
Beck, T., A. Demirgüç-Kunt & R. Levine (2005/06)

Elections and Exchange Rate Policy Cycles   Recommended!
Bonomo, M. & C. Terra (2005)
Abstract: This paper presents a theoretical model based on the distributive effects of real exchange rate (RER) changes that generates RER electoral cycles of the type identified in Latin American countries: more appreciated RER before elections and more depreciated after elections. Typically, a RER depreciation favors exporters and import-competing domestic industries, to the detriment of consumers. These RER cycles are generated by imperfect information on policy-makers' preferences, which are concealed from voters with the help of an unstable macroeconomic environment. Exchange rate cycles result from the interplay between the electoral power of the non-tradable sector and the tradable sector's ability to lobby the government.

Which Variables Explain Decisions on IMF Credit? An Extreme Bounds Analysis
Sturm, J-E., H. Berger & J. de Haan (2005)

The Political Economy of Seigniorage
Aisen, A. & J. Francisco (2005)

The Stability of the Inter-war Gold Exchange Standard. Did Politics Matter?   Acrobat Required
Wandschneider, K. (2005)

What drives international bank flows? Politics, institutions and other determinants | Published   ScienceDirect Required
Papaioannou, E. (2005/08)

Real Exchange Rate Cycles Around Elections   Wiley Interscience Required
Stein, E.H., J.M. Streb & P. Ghezzi (2005)

Income Distribution, Sovereign Debt, and Public Investment   Wiley Interscience Required
Karayalcin, C. & K. McCollister (2005)

The Political Economy of Fixed Exchange Rates: A Survival Analysis   Acrobat Required
Setzer, R. (2005)

IMF programs: Who is chosen and what are the effects?   ScienceDirect Required
Barro, R.J. & J-W. Lee (2005)

Financial Crises and Political Crises | Published   Recommended!   ScienceDirect Required
Chang, R. (2005/07)
Abstract: This paper is an analysis of the simultaneous determination of financial default and political crises and its consequences. It focuses on a small open economy that faces a debt default decision. Crucially, this decision is made by a government that has superior information than the public about the social costs of default. Citizens can dismiss the government, and overrule its default decision, at the cost of a political crisis. If there is a divergence between the objectives of the government and its people, a political crisis may emerge in equilibrium. For this to be the case, the foreign debt must be large enough, and international reserves low. When this political equilibrium is seen as a part of a larger investment problem, there are equilibria in which crises are "only financial," and equilibria in which both default and political crises occur. In some cases, these two kinds of equilibria coexist and, in this sense, a loss of confidence by foreign lenders can exacerbate the likelihood of a political crisis. If so, international intervention in financial markets may ensure financial and political stability at little cost.

Bagehot or Bailout? An Analysis of Government Responses to Banking Crises   Wiley Interscience Required
Rosas, G. (2005)

The Politics of Bank Failures: Evidence from Emerging Markets   Ingenta Select Required
Brown, C.O. & D.I. Serdar (2005)

The Political Economy of Financial Fragility | Alternative   Adobe Acrobat Required
Feijen, E. & E.C. Perotti (2005)

Political Pressures and Monetary Mystique   Adobe Acrobat Required
Geraats, P.M. (2005)

Regulatory Capture in Banking
Hardy, D.C. (2006)

Globalisation and the mix of wage and profit taxes   Adobe Acrobat Required
Haufler, A., A. Klemm & G. Schjelderup (2006)

The Political Economy of Financial Liberalisation   Acrobat Required
Shortland, A. & S. Girma (2005)

The Evolution of International Political Risk 1956-2001   Acrobat Required
Tunaru, R. & E. Clark (2005)

Project Aid or Budget Aid? The Interests of Governments and Financial Institutions   Acrobat Required
Hefeker, C. (2005)

Shareholder Protection, Stock Market Development and Politics
Pagano, M. & P.F. Volpin (2006)

Central Bank Independence and the `Free Lunch Puzzle': A New Perspective   Acrobat Required
al-Nowaihi, A., P. Levine & A. Mandilaras (2006)

Can Budget Institutions Counteract Political Indiscipline?
Fabrizio, S. & A. Mody (2006)

On the political economy of financial reform   Acrobat Required
Huang, Y. (2006)

Electoral Uncertainty and the Volatility of International Capital Flows
Chang, R. (2006)

EMU Enlargement, Policy Uncertainty and Economic Reforms   Acrobat Required
Hefeker, C. (2006)

Geography Rules Too! Economic Development and the Geography of Institutions   Acrobat Required
Bosker, M. & H. Garretsen (2006)

Does membership on the UN Security Council influence IMF decisions? Evidence from panel data | Published   Acrobat Required   ScienceDirect Required
Dreher, A., J-E. Sturm & J.R. Vreeland (2006/08)

Give Trust a Chance--A Model of Trust in the Context of an IMF-Supported Program   Acrobat Required
Sembene, D. (2007)

Testing and Measuring the Role of Ideas: The Case of Neoliberalism in the International Monetary Fund   Wiley Interscience Required
Chwieroth, J.M. (2007)

When Globalization Discontent Turns Violent: Foreign Economic Liberalization and Internal War   Wiley Interscience Required
Bussman, M. & G. Schneider (2007)

Preferences for Protectionism: Do economic factors really matter?   Acrobat Required
Melgar, N., J. Milgram & M. Rossi (2007)

Politically Optimal Fiscal Policy
Kumhof, M. & I. Yakadina (2007)

Banking on Democracy: The Political Economy of International Private Bank Lending in Emerging Markets
Rodríguez, J. & J. Santiso (2007)

Foreign Exchange Intervention and the Political Business Cycle: A Panel Data Analysis | Published   Acrobat Required
Dreher, A. & R. Vaubel (2007/09)

Bono Made Jesse Helms Cry: Jubilee 2000, Debt Relief, and Moral Action in International Politics   Wiley Interscience Required
Busby, J.W. (2007)

The Political Economy of Numbers: On the Application of Benford's Law to International Macroeconomic Statistics
Nye, J. & C. Moul (2007)

The Politics of IMF Forecasts   Acrobat Required
Dreher, A., S. Marchesi & J.R. Vreeland (2007)

Bank bailouts and political instability   ScienceDirect Required
Vaugirard, V. (2007)

Default, Electoral Uncertainty and the Choice of Exchange Regime   Acrobat Required
Hefeker, C. (2007)

The Role of Institutional Quality in a Currency Crisis Model   Recommended!
Wu, Y. (2008)
Abstract: This paper is a theoretical study of the impact of institutional quality on currency crises from a public finance point of view. Recent empirical studies leave little doubt that weak institutions, including high levels of corruption, hinder economic performance. After the East Asian crisis, many observers have pointed to widespread corruption and crony capitalism as an underlying cause. Despite the popularity of the claim, there are only limited empirical and especially theoretical studies on the link between institutional quality and currency crises. This paper intends to fill in this void. We model institutional weakness as an inefficiency of the tax collection system. The model derived here shows that institutional weakness generally increases the likelihood of the existence of a self-fulfilling crisis equilibrium, and leads to larger currency devaluation when crises happen. However, this relationship could reverse when institutional weakness is very severe.

Political Monetary Cycles and a New de facto Ranking of Central Bank Independence
Alpanda, S. & A. Honig (2008)

The Impact of Political Risk on Sovereign Bond Spreads: Evidence from Latin America   Acrobat Required
Moser, C. (2008)

Political Economy Origins of Financial Markets in Europe and Asia   Acrobat Required
Andrianova, S., P. Demetriades & C. Xu (2008)

Political and institutional factors in regime change in the ERM: An application of duration analysis   Acrobat Required
Sosvilla-Rivero, S. & F. Pérez-Bermejo (2008)

The governance of the World Bank : analysis and implications of the decisional power of the G10   Acrobat Required
Foch, A. (2008)

Exchange Rate Determination: A Model of the Decisive Role of Central Bank Cooperation and Conflict   Acrobat Required
Pope, R., R. Selten, S. Kube, J. Kaiser & J. von Hagen (2008)

Politically generated uncertainty and currency crises: Theory, tests, and forecasts   ScienceDirect Required
Leblang, D. & S. Satyanath (2008)

Political Business Cycles through Lobbying   Acrobat Required
Bonomo, M. & C. Terra (2008)

Do IMF Programs Improve Economic Governance?
Honda, J. (2008)

Monetary Politics in a Monetary Union: A Note on Common Agency with Rational Expectations   Acrobat Required
Ruta, M. (2008)

The political economy of seigniorage   ScienceDirect Required
Aisen, A. & F.J. Veiga (2008)

The Political Economy of Financial Systems   Acrobat Required   SURVEY PAPER
Haber, S. & E. Perotti (2008)

Who is Against a Common Market?
Facchini, G. & C. Testa (2008)

Do External Political Pressures Affect the Renminbi Exchange Rate?   Acrobat Required
Liu, L-G., L. Pauwels & J-Y. Chan (2008)

A Model of Sovereign Debt in Democracies
Alichi, A. (2008)

Incumbents and protectionism: The political economy of foreign entry liberalization   ScienceDirect Required
Chari, A. & N. Gupta (2008)

Sovereign default, interest rates and political uncertainty in emerging markets   ScienceDirect Required
Cuadra, G. & H. Sapriza (2008)

Interest group pressure explanations for the yen–dollar exchange rate movements: Focusing on the 1980s   ScienceDirect Required
Kim, I. & I. Kim (2008)

A Micro-Empirical Foundation for the Political Economy of Exchange Rate Populism
De Carvalho Filho, I. & M. Chamon (2008)

Political Risk, Economic Integration, and the Foreign Direct Investment Decision   Acrobat Required
Chen, F-Y. & M. Funke (2008)

The Political Economy of the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis   Recommended!
Mian, A., A. Sufi & F. Trebbi (2008)
Abstract: We examine the determinants of congressional voting behavior on two of the most significant pieces of federal legislation in U.S. economic history: the American Housing Rescue and Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2008 and the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. We find evidence that constituent interests and special interests influence voting patterns during the crisis. Representatives from districts experiencing an increase in mortgage default rates are significantly more likely to vote in favor of the AHRFPA. They are precise in responding only to mortgage related constituent defaults, and are significantly more sensitive to defaults of their own-party constituents. Increased campaign contributions from the financial services industry is associated with a higher likelihood of voting in favor of the EESA, a bill which transfers wealth from tax payers to the financial services industry. We also examine the trade-off between politician ideology and constituent and special interests, and find that conservative politicians are less responsive to constituent and special interest pressure. This latter finding suggests that politicians, through ideology, can commit against intervention even during severe crises.

Sovereign Wealth Funds: Current Institutional and Operational Practices
Hammer, C., P. Kunzel & I. Petrova (2008)

The political economy under monetary union - has the euro made a difference?   Acrobat Required
Fratzscher, M. & L. Stracca (2008)

From Crisis to IMF-Supported Program: Does democracy impede the speed required by financial markets?
Mody, A. & D. Saravia (2008)

The Flypaper Effect
Inman, R.P. (2008)

"Currency Manipulation" and World Trade   Recommended!
Staiger, R.W. & A.O. Sykes (2008

Abstract: Central bank intervention in foreign exchange markets may, under some conditions, stimulate exports and retard imports. In the past few years, this issue has moved to center stage because of the foreign exchange policies of China. China has regularly intervened to prevent the RMB from appreciating relative to other currencies, and over the same period has developed large global and bilateral trade surpluses. Numerous public officials and commentators argue that China has engaged in impermissible "currency manipulation," and various proposals for stiff action against China have been advanced. This paper clarifies the theoretical relationship between exchange rate policy and international trade, and addresses the question of what content can be given to the concept of "currency manipulation" as a measure that may impair the commitments made in trade agreements. Our conclusions are at odds with much of what is currently being said by proponents of counter-measures against China. For example, it is often asserted that China's currency policies have real effects that are equivalent to an export subsidy. In fact, however, if prices are flexible the effect of exchange rate intervention parallels that of a uniform import tariff and export subsidy, which will have no real effect on trade, an implication of Lerner's symmetry theorem. With sticky prices, the real effects of exchange rate intervention and the translation of that intervention into trade-policy equivalents depend critically on how traded goods and services are priced. The real effects of China's policies are potentially quite complex, are not readily translated into trade-policy equivalents, and are dependent on the time frame over which they are evaluated (because prices are less "sticky" over a longer time frame).

Wall Street and Elections in Latin American Emerging Economies
Parra, S.N. & J. Santiso (2008)

The Value of Institutions for Financial Markets: Evidence from Emerging Markets
Akitoby, B. & T. Stratmann (2009)

The political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of World Bank loan disbursements   ScienceDirect Required
Kilby, C. (2009)

Geopolitics and international organizations: An empirical study on IMF facilities   ScienceDirect Required
Reynaud, J. & J. Vauday (2009)

The political economy of the subprime crisis: Why subprime was so attractive to its creators   ScienceDirect Required
Swan, P.L. (2009)

International Financial Assistance: A Loan Mechanism-Design Approach   Wiley Interscience Required
Mourmouras, A. & W. Mayer (2009)

Banking on politics
Braun, M. & C. Raddatz (2009)

Stock Market Returns and Partisan Political Business Cycles
Cooley, J. (2009)

Expropriation Dynamics   Ingenta Select Required
Aguiar, M., M. Amador & G. Gopinath (2009)

Financial Crisis and the Paradox of Under- and Over-Regulation
Aizenman, J. (2009)

Coalition Governments and Sovereign Debt Crises   Wiley Interscience Required
Saiegh, S.M. (2009)

Land and Credit: A Study of the Political Economy of Banking in the United States in the Early 20th Century
Rajan, R.G. & R. Ramcharan (2009)

How Foreign Aid Can Foster Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes   Wiley Interscience Required
Wright, J. (2009)

Does foreign aid improve governance?   ScienceDirect Required
Busse, M. & S. Gröning (2009)

Behind the Development Banks
Babb, S. (2009)

Does it pay to have the euro? Italy’s politics and financial markets under the lira and the euro   Acrobat Required
Fratzscher, M. & L. Stracca (2009)

The Political Economy of Regulatory Risk   Acrobat Required
Strausz, R. (2009)

Public Goods or Political Pandering: Evidence from IMF Programs in Latin America and Eastern Europe   Wiley Interscience Required
Pop-Eleches, G. (2009)

Speculative attacks and defenses as wars of attrition   ScienceDirect Required
Grier, K. & S. Lin (2009)

Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council   ScienceDirect Required
Dreher, A., J-E. Sturm & J.R. Vreeland (2009)

The Interactions of Strength of Governments and Alternative Exchange Rate Regimes in Avoiding Currency Crises   Wiley Interscience Required
Chiu, E.M.P. & T.D. Willett (2009)

Exchange Rate and Political Risks, Again   Acrobat Required
Clare, G. & I.N. Gang (2009)

International Institutions and Domestic Compensation: The IMF and the Politics of Capital Account Liberalization   Wiley Interscience Required
Mukherjee, B. & D.A. Singer (2009)

The Politics of External Debt in Developing Countries   Acrobat Required
Colombo, E. & E. Longoni (2009)

A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis
Igan, D., P. Mishra & T. Tressel (2009)

Donors and domestic politics: Political influences on foreign aid effort   ScienceDirect Required
Tingley, D. (2010)

Macrofinancial Linkages of the Strategic Asset Allocation of Commodity-Based Sovereign Wealth Funds
Brown, A., M.G. Papaioannou & I. Petrova (2010)

Global and Diplomatic Political Risks and Foreign Direct Investment   Wiley Interscience Required
Desbordes, R. (2010)

Taxation, corruption and the exchange rate regime   ScienceDirect Required
Hefeker, C. (2010)

The Political Economy of the Yield Curve   Acrobat Required
Di Maggio, M. (2010)

International Commodity Price Shocks, Democracy, and External Debt
Arezki, R. & M. Bruckner (2010)

Home | Back | Index | Search


International Political Economy

Theory and Structure in International Political Economy: An International Organization Reader   Recommended!   CONFERENCE VOLUME
Cohen, B.J. & C. Lipson (Editors) (1999)
Abstract: This is the first of two anthologies on international political economy drawn from articles published in the journal International Organization. The book is organized into four sections: Contending Theoretical Perspectives, International Regimes, Multilateralism and International Leadership, and International Economy and Domestic Politics.

Issues and Agents in International Political Economy: An International Organization Reader   Recommended!   CONFERENCE VOLUME
Cohen, B.J. & C. Lipson (Editors) (1999)
Abstract: This is the second of two anthologies on international political economy drawn from articles published in the journal International Organization. The book is organized into four sections: Trade, Multinational Firms and Globalization, Money and Finance, and Emerging Issues.

Democracy and International Financial Liberalization
Quinn, D.P. (2000)

The International Political Economy of the Environment: Critical Perspectives
Stevis, D. & V. Assetto (Editors) (2001)

Abstract: The authors of this volume investigate the framing of both problems and solutions to clarify the particular political dynamics and preferences that they reflect and legitimate. They intend to do this without assuming, as they believe many practitioners and scholars do, that while there may be disagreement about solutions, everyone knows what the problems are. This publication intends to combine theory with empirical research in order to raise theoretical questions at the core of research and policymaking that values social equity and environmental health. In combination, they intend to tell a cohesive, substantive story about the IPE of the environment at the beginning of the third millennium.

The European Central Bank and Legitimacy Is the ECB a Modification of or an Exception to the Principle of Democracy?
Leino, P. (2001)

Independent and Accountable Central Banks and the European Central Bank
de Sousa, P.A.B. (2001)

The Political Economy of International Emissions Trading Scheme Choice: Empirical Evidence   Adobe Acrobat Required!
Boom, J.T. & G.T. Svendsen (2001)

Abstract: The Kyoto Protocol allows international emissions trading, which could take place in three different forms: government, permit, or credit trading. Which trading system is chosen is likely to depend on the preferences of several interest groups. In this paper, we give empirical evidence on the preferences of industry and environmental organizations for national environmental policy instrument and for international emissions trading scheme. Furthermore, we present data that gives an indication about the level of rent-seeking by these groups at the international level. The aim of this paper is to identify which instruments are politically most feasible.

Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy
Arquilla, J. & D. Ronfeldt (eds) (2001)

Summary: The fight for the future is not between the armies of leading states, nor are its weapons those of traditional armed forces. Rather, the combatants come from bomb-making terrorist groups like Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, or drug smuggling cartels like those in Colombia and Mexico. On the positive side are civil-society activists fighting for the environment, democracy and human rights. What all have in common is that they operate in small, dispersed units that can deploy anywhere, anytime to penetrate and disrupt. They all feature network forms of organization, doctrine, strategy, and technology attuned to the information age. And, from the Intifadah to the drug war, they are proving very hard to beat.

The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties
Scotchmer, S. (2002)

World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability
Chua, A. (2002)

Do Rich Countries Choose Better Governments?
Azariadis, C. & A. Lahiri (2002)

Annexation or Conquest? The Economics of Empire Building
Grossman, H. (2002)

Belief in a Just World and Redistributive Politics   Adobe Acrobat Required   Recommended!
Tirole, J. & R. Benabou (2002)
Abstract: This paper develops a joint theory of ideology and redistributive policy to account for the striking divergence found across countries in voters? attitudes about the causes of individual wealth and poverty (self-reliance or societal forces), as well as in the observed social contract (laissez-faire or welfare-state). In particular, the model sheds light on how expectations of high mobility are sustained (the ?American Dream?) and dampen the demand for redistribution. In so doing, it draws on studies by sociologists and psychologists that document the cognitive efforts often required to maintain, and pass on to one?s children, the view that hard work and sacrifices will ultimately bring a better life, that people get what they deserve, and deserve what they get. The paper thus offers a psychologically grounded but nonetheless rational politico-economic model of why people may feel a need to ?believe in a just world?; of why this need, and therefore the prevalence of the belief, may vary considerably across countries; and of its implications for redistributive policies and the stigma born by the poor.

Globalization and Political Geography   Adobe Acrobat Required
Etro, F. (2003)

Fifty-four Forty or Fight!
Grossman, H. (2003)

War or Peace
Cai, H. (2003)

Democracy, Ideology And Income Inequality: An Empirical Analysis Adobe Acrobat Required
Milanovic, B., M. Gradstein & Y. Ying (2003)

Nation-Building: The Inescapable Responsibility of the World's Only Superpower
Dobbins, J. (2003)

Turbulent Waters: Cross-border Finance and International Governance   Recommended!
Bryant, R. (2003)
Abstract: Today's world is organized politically into nation states with sovereign national governments. But as author Ralph C. Bryant explains, the world's economic structure is outgrowing its political structure. This book's ambitious goal is no less than to outline a pragmatically sound vision for the evolution of international governance for the world economy and financial system.

Developing countries: victims or participants, their changing role in international negotiations   Acrobat Required
Page, S. (2003)

Self Enforcing Voting in International Organizations   Recommended!
Maggi, G. & M. Morelli (2003)
Abstract: Some international organizations are governed by unanimity rule, some others by a majority system. Still others have moved from one system to the other over time. The existing voting models, which generally assume that decisions made by voting are perfectly enforceable, have a difficult time explaining the observed variation in governance mode, and in particular the widespread occurrence of the unanimity system. We present a model whose main departure from standard voting models is that there is no external enforcement mechanism: each country is sovereign and cannot be forced to follow the collective decision, or in other words, the voting system must be self-enforcing. The model yields unanimity as the optimal system for a wide range of parameters, and delivers rich predictions on the variation in the mode of governance, both across organizations and over time.

The Political Economy of Failed Stabilization   Acrobat Required
Veiga, F.J. (2003)

A Theory of Economic Sanctions and Issue Linkage: The Roles of Preferences, Information, and Threats   Wiley Interscience Required
Lacy, D. & E.M.S. Niou (2004)

National Sovereignty in an Interdependent World
Bagwell, K. & R.W. Staiger (2004)

International Economic Sanctions Against a Dictator   Wiley Interscience Required
Kaempfer, W.H., A.D. Lowenberg & W. Mertens (2004)

The Size of Nations   Recommended!
Alesina, A. & E. Spolaore (2004)
Abstract: A groundbreaking work synthesizing economics, political science, and history argues that a cost-benefit trade-off can explain the pattern of nation size and formation.

Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field
Elman, C. & M.F. Elman (2004)

America the Virtuous: the Crisis of Democracy and the Quest for Empire
Ryn, C. (2004)

The Rules of the Global Game   Recommended!
Dam, K.W. (2004)
Abstract: Economic news once confined to the business pages of the newspapers now receives headline coverage, whether it involves protests in Seattle or sweatshops in Asia. As attention comes increasingly to be focused on economic policy, it becomes even more important for noneconomists to be able to make sense of the stories and the coverage. Is the Asian economy sinking or rising? What effects will a single European currency have on the U.S. economy? Kenneth W. Dam's The Rules of the Global Game provides, in clear and practical language, a framework to help readers understand and answer these types of questions. Dam first lays out what the U.S. international economic policies are and compares them to what they should be based on how they affect U.S. per capita income. With this foundation in place, Dam then develops principles that he applies to elucidating the major components of economic policy, such as foreign trade and investment, international monetary and financial systems, and current controversial issues, including intellectual property and immigration. Underlying his explanations is a belief in the importance of worldwide free trade and open markets, but also, crucially, an understanding of the political forces that shape decision making. Because economic policy is not created in a political vacuum, Dam argues, sound policymaking requires an understanding of "statecraft"the creation and use of institutions that channel the efforts of interest groups and political forces in directions that encourage good economic outcomes. A rare book that can be read with pleasure and profit by layperson and economist alike, The Rules of the Global Game allows readers to get beyond the headlines to understand the policies that shape our economy and thus our lives.

On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union   Adobe Acrobat Required
Barbera, S. & M.O. Jackson (2004)

Macro vs. Micro-Level Perspectives on Economic Voting: Is the Micro-Level Evidence Endogenously Induced?   Adobe Acrobat Required
Erikson, R.S. (2004)

Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, With an Application to Britains "Age of Reform"   Ingenta Select Required
Lizzeri, A. & N. Persico (2004)

Economic and Political Liberalizations | Published   Adobe Acrobat Required   ScienceDirect Required
Giavazzi, F. & G. Tabellini (2004/2005)

Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of Production   Wiley Interscience Required
Scheve, K. & M.J. Slaughter (2004)

Rule of Law, Democracy, Openness, and Income: Estimating the Interrelationships
Rigobon, R. & D. Rodrik (2004)

EU Enlargement and Anti-Globalization: New Paradox or Old Paradigm
Finel-Honigman, I. (2004)

Globalization, Comparative Advantage, and Europe's Double Competitive Squeeze
Salvatore, D. (2004)

The Future of Global Governance   Acrobat Required
Stiglitz, J.E. (2004)

Institutions and the External Capital Structure of Countries | Published   ScienceDirect Required
Faria, A. & P. Mauro (2004/09)

The Size of the Shadow Economies of 145 Countries all over the World: First Results over the Period 1999 to 2003
Schneider, F. (2004)

Who Runs the IFIs?
Faini, R. & E. Grilli (2004)

Economic Theories of Political (Dis)integration   Wiley Interscience Required   SURVEY PAPER
Ruta, M. (2005)

Rationality, Ethnicity And Institutions: A Survey Of Issues And Results   Wiley Interscience Required   SURVEY PAPER
Kyriacou, A.P. (2005)

The Coming Democracy: New Rules for Running a New World
Florini, A. (2005)

A Political Economy Approach to the Neoclassical Gradualist Model of Transition   Ingenta Select Required
Marangos, J. (2005)

Geopolitical interests and preferential access to U.S. markets
Lederman, D. & C. Ozden (2005)

War, peace, and the size of countries   ScienceDirect Required
Alesina, A. & E. Spolaore (2005)

Democratization and Clientelism: Why Are Young Democracies Badly Governed?
Keefer, P. (2005)

The Global Economic System since 1945
Allen, L. (2005)

A Theory of Political Cycles   Acrobat Required
Martinez, L. (2005)

On the Political Economy of Adverse Selection   Acrobat Required
Cres, H. & M. Tvede (2005)

Globalization and the Strengthening of Democracy in the Developing World   Wiley Interscience Required
Rudra, N. (2005)

Economic Globalization and Civil War   Wiley Interscience Required
Barbieri, K. & R. Reuveny (2005)

A Theory of Brinkmanship, Conflicts, and Commitments
Schwarz, M. & K. Sonin (2005)

Conflict, defense spending, and the number of nations   ScienceDirect Required
Alesina, A. & E. Spolaore (2005)

The Market for Protection and the Origin of the State   Acrobat Required
Konrad, K.A. & S. Skaperdas (2005)

Which Countries Have State Religions?   Ingenta Select Required
Barro, R.J. & R.M. McCleary (2005)

Life After Kyoto: Alternative Approaches to Global Warming
Shimer, R. (2005)

Measuring Risk: Political Risk Insurance Premiums and Domestic Political Institutions   Adobe Acrobat Required
Jensen, N.M. (2005)

Re-Election Incentives and the Sustainability of International Cooperation
Conconi, P. & N. Sahuguet (2006)

Geographic Proximity, Trade and International Conflict/Cooperation
Robst, J., S. Polachek & Y-C. Chang (2006)

IMF and economic growth: The effects of programs, loans, and compliance with conditionality   ScienceDirect Required
Dreher, A. (2006)

The political advantage of soft budget constraints   ScienceDirect Required
Desaia, R.J. & A. Olofsgård (2006)

Does quality of openness affect corruption?   ScienceDirect Required
Gokcekus, O. & J. Knörich (2006)

Artificial States   Acrobat Required
Alesina, A.F., W. Easterly & J. Matuszeski (2006)

The Global Impact of Demographic Change   Adobe Acrobat Required
Batini, N., T. Callen & W.J. McKibbin (2006)

Terrorism as Economic Warfare
Lutz, J.M. & B.J. Lutz (2006)

Does the World Economy Swing National Elections?   Acrobat Required
Leigh, A. (2006)

Trust in International Organizations: An Empirical Investigation Focusing on the United Nations
Torgler, B. (2006)

Globalization and Democracy
Eichengreen, B. & D. Leblang (2006)

Corruption, competition and democracy   ScienceDirect Required
Emerson, P.M. (2006)

How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations
Kuziemko, I. & E. Werker (2006)

Democracy and Foreign Education
Spilmbergo, A. (2006)

Gradualism and Uncertainty in International Union Formation   Acrobat Required
Konstantinidis, N. (2007)

Superpower Interventions and their Consequences for Democracy: An Empirical Inquiry
Easterly, W., S. Satyanath & D. Berger (2008)

Do credible domestic institutions promote credible international agreements?   ScienceDirect Required
Conconi, P. & C. Perroni (2009)

International organizations and arrangements: Pivotal countries and manipulations   ScienceDirect Required
Miljkovic, D. (2009)

Partisan Waves: International Business Cycles and Electoral Choice   Wiley Interscience Required
Kayser, M.A. (2009)

The political economy of imperialism, decolonization, and development   Acrobat Required
Gartzke, E. & D. Rohner (2010)

Home | Back | Index | Search


Comparative Political Economy

Modern Political Economy: Old Questions, New Answers
Banks, J.S. & E.A. Hanushek (eds) (1995)

Economic Politics: The Costs of Democracy
Keech, W.R. (1995)

Three Brief Proofs of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem | Published   Recommended!   Adobe Acrobat Required
Geanakoplos, J. (1996/2005)
Abstract: Arrow's original proof of his impossibility theorem proceeded in two steps: showing the existence of a decisive voter, and then showing that a decisive voter is a dictator. Barbera replaced the decisive voter with the weaker notion of a pivotal voter, thereby shortening the first step, but complicating the second step. I give three brief proofs, all of which turn on replacing the decisive/pivotal voter with an extremely pivotal voter (a voter who by unilaterally changing his vote can move some alternative from the bottom of the social ranking to the top), thereby simplifying both steps in Arrowrsquos proof. My first proof is the most straightforward, and the second uses Condorcet preferences (which are transformed into each other by moving the bottom alternative to the top). The third proof proceeds by reinterpreting Step 1 of the first proof as saying that all social decisions are made the same way (neutrality).

Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy   Recommended!
Alesina, A. & N. Roubini (1997)
Abstract: The relationship between political and economic cycles is one of the most widely studied topics in political economics. This book examines how electoral laws, the timing of elections, the ideological orientation of governments, and the nature of competition between political parties influence unemployment, economic growth, inflation, and monetary and fiscal policy. The book presents both a thorough overview of the theoretical literature and a vast amount of empirical evidence. A common belief is that voters reward incumbents who artificially create favorable conditions before an election, even though the economy may take a turn for the worse immediately thereafter. The authors argue that the dynamics of political cycles are far more complex. In their review of the main theoretical approaches to the issues, they demonstrate the multifaceted relationships between macroeconomic and political policies. They also present a broad range of empirical data, from the United States as well as OECD countries. One of their most striking findings is that the United States is not exceptional; the relationships between political and economic cycles are remarkably similar in other democracies, particularly those with two-party systems.

The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives   Adobe Acrobat Required
Lizzeri, A. & N. Persico (1998)

The Drawbacks of Electoral Competition   Adobe Acrobat Required
Lizzeri, A. & N. Persico (2000)

Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy   Recommended!
Persson, T. & G. Tabellini (2000)
Abstract: What determines the size and form of redistributive programs, the extent and type of public goods provision, the burden of taxation across alternative tax bases, the size of government deficits, and the stance of monetary policy during the course of business and electoral cycles? A large and rapidly growing literature in political economics attempts to answer these questions. But so far there is little consensus on the answers and disagreement on the appropriate mode of analysis. Combining the best of three separate traditions--the theory of macroeconomic policy, public choice, and rational choice in political science--Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini suggest a unified approach to the field. As in modern macroeconomics, individual citizens behave rationally, their preferences over economic outcomes inducing preferences over policy. As in public choice, the delegation of policy decisions to elected representatives may give rise to agency problems between voters and politicians. And, as in rational choice, political institutions shape the procedures for setting policy and electing politicians. The authors outline a common method of analysis, establish several new results, and identify the main outstanding problems.

Political Economy in Macroeconomics   Recommended!
Drazen, A. (2000)
Abstract: Originally, economics was called political economy, and those studying it readily accepted that economic decisions are made in a political world. But economics eventually separated itself from politics to pursue rigorous methods of analyzing individual behavior and markets. Recently, an increasing number of economists have turned their attention to the old question of how politics shape economic outcomes. To date, however, this growing literature has lacked a cogent organization and a unified approach. Here, in the first full-length examination of how political forces affect economic policy decisions, Allan Drazen provides a systematic treatment, organizing the increasingly influential "new political economy" as a more established field at the highly productive intersection of economics and political science. Although he provides an extraordinarily helpful guide to the recent explosion of papers on political economy in macroeconomics, Drazen moves far beyond survey, giving definition and structure to the field. He proposes that conflict or heterogeneity of interests should be the field's essential organizing principle, because political questions arise only when people disagree over which economic policies should be enacted or how economic costs and benefits should be distributed. Further, he illustrates how heterogeneity of interests is crucial in every part of political economy. Drazen's approach allows innovative treatment--using rigorous economic models--of public goods and finance, economic growth, the open economy, economic transition, political business cycles, and all of the traditional topics of macroeconomics.

Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective   Ingenta Select Required
Acemoglu, D. & J.A. Robinson (2000)
Abstract: During the nineteenth century most Western societies extended voting rights, a decision that led to unprecedented redistributive programs. We argue that these political reforms can be viewed as strategic decisions by the political elite to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution. Political transition, rather than redistribution under existing political institutions, occurs because current transfers do not ensure future transfers, while the extension of the franchise changes future political equilibria and acts as a commitment to redistribution. Our theory also offers a novel explanation for the Kuznets curve in many Western economies during this period, with the fall in inequality following redistribution due to democratization.

Modelling Politics with Economic Tools - A Critical Survey of the Literature   Recommended!   Acrobat Required
Olters, J.P. (2001)

Do Political Institutions Shape Economic Policy?
Persson, T. (2001)

The Political Economy of Redistribution Under Asymmetric Information   Acrobat Required
Dhami, S. (2001)

The Evolution of Suffrage Institutions in the New World
Engerman, S.L. & K.L. Sokoloff (2001)
Abstract: We provide a cultural explanation to the phenomenon of corruption in the framework of an overlapping generations model with intergenerational transmission of values. We show that the economy has two steady states with different levels of corruption. The driving force in the equilibrium selection process is the education effort exerted by parents which depends on the distribution of ethics in the population and on expectations about future policies. We propose some policy interventions which via parents' efforts have long-lasting effects on corruption and show the success of intensive education campaigns. Educating the young is a key element in reducing corruption successfully.

Multiple Politico-Economic Regimes, Inequality and Growth   Acrobat Required   WinZip Required
Desdoigts, A. & F. Moizeau (2001)

Economic Reform, Democracy and Growth During Post-Communist Transition   Acrobat Required
Fidrmuc, J. (2001)

Political Instability and Growth in Dictatorships   Acrobat Required
Overland, J., K.L. Simons & M. Spagat (2001)

Political Market Structure
Anderson, J.E. & T.J. Prusa (2001)

On the Cultural Transmission of Corruption   Acrobat Required
Hauk, E. & M. Sáez-Martí (2001)

Some International Evidence on Deviations from Pocketbook Voting and Its Relevance for the Political Economy   Adobe Acrobat Required!
Wong, W.K. (2001)

Does Liberté=Egalité? A Survey of the Empirical Links between Democracy and Inequality
Gradstein, M. & B. Milanovic (2002)

Social Choice in the General Spatial Model of Politics   Adobe Acrobat Required
Banks, J., J. Duggan & M. Le Breton (2002)

Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment and Politics
Acemoglu, D. (2002)

Fractionalization
Alesina, A., A. Devleeschauwer, W. Easterly, S. Kurlat &l R. Wacziarg (2002)

The Politics of Endogenous Growth   Adobe Acrobat Required
Ghate, C. & P.J. Zak (2003)

Non-dictatorial extensive social choice Adobe Acrobat Required
Ooghe, E. & L. Lauwers (2003)

The Political Economy of Taxation: Positive and Normative Analysis when Collective Choice Matters Adobe Acrobat Required
Winer, S.L. & W. Hettich (2003)

The New Comparative Economics
Djankov, S., E.L. Glaeser, R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silane & A. Shleifer (2003)

Redistribution in a Divided Society   Adobe Acrobat Required
Austen-Smith, D. & M. Wallerstein (2003)

Time-Consistent Policy and Politics: Does Voting Matter When Individuals Are Identical?
Anderberg, D. & C. Perroni (2003)

Computational Models in Political Economy   Recommended!   CONFERENCE VOLUME
Kollman, K., J.H. Miller & S.E. Page (Editors) (2003)
Abstract: Researchers are increasingly turning to computational methods to study the dynamic properties of political and economic systems. Politicians, citizens, interest groups, and organizations interact in dynamic, complex environments, and the static models that are predominant in political economy are limited in capturing fundamental features of economic decision making in modern democracies. Computational models--numerical approximations of equilibria and dynamics that cannot be solved analytically--provide useful insight into the behavior of economic agents and the aggregate properties of political systems. They serve as a valuable complement to existing mathematical tools. This book offers some of the latest research on computational political economy. The focus is on theoretical models of traditional problems in the field. Each chapter presents an innovative model of interaction between economic agents. Topics include voting behavior, candidate position taking, special interest group contributions, macroeconomic policy making, and corporate decision making.

Is democracy more expropriative than dictatorship? Tocquevillian wisdom revisited   ScienceDirect Required
Lee, W. (2003)

Does Democracy Engender Equality?   Acrobat Required
Roemer, J.E. (2003)

Presidential Elections and the Stock Market: Comparing Markov-Switching and (FIE)GARCH Models of Stock Volatility   Acrobat Required
Leblang, D. & B. Mukherjee (2003)

Rational Actor Models in Political Science   Acrobat Required
Borooah, V.K. (2003)

Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting
Akhmedov, A.. A. Ravitchev & E. Zhuravskaya (2003)

Representative versus Direct Democracy: The Role of Informational Asymmetries
Kessler, A. (2003)

Between liberalism and democracy   ScienceDirect Required
Samet, D. & D. Schmeidler (2003)

A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence
Eggertsson, G.B. & E. Le Borgne (2003)

The Politics of Endogenous Growth
Ghate, C. (2003)

The concept and measurement of economic freedom   ScienceDirect Required
Gwartney, J. & R. Lawson (2003)

Does more democracy lead to greater economic freedom? New evidence for developing countries   ScienceDirect Required
de Haan, J. & J-E. Sturm (2003)

Path Dependence, Uneven Industrialization and Special Interests   Adobe Acrobat Required
Zhao, R. & S.L. Parente (2003)

The Limits of Bureaucratic Efficiency
Prendergast, C. (2003)

Trading and Voting
Musto, D.K. & B. Yilmaz (2003)

Capture by Threat
Dal Bo, E. & R. Di Tella (2003)

Where Does the Political Budget Cycle Really Come From?
Brender, A. & A. Drazen (2003)

The Political Economy of Public Spending on Education, Inequality, and Growth
Gradstein, M. (2003)

Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor
Keefer, P. & S. Khemani (2003)

Forming Voting Blocs and Coalitions as a Prisoner's Dilemma: A Possible Theoretical Explanation for Political Instability
Gelman, A. (2003)

A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy   ScienceDirect Required
De Sinopoli, F. (2003)

The Political Economy of Interest Groups: Pressure and Information   Adobe Acrobat Required
Porteiro, N. & M. Dahm (2003)

Self-serving dictators and economic growth   Adobe Acrobat Required
Sadrieh, A., D. Haile & H.A.A. Verbon (2003)

A Social Choice Lemma on Voting over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games   Adobe Acrobat Required
Banks, J. & J. Duggan (2003)

Spatial Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information   Adobe Acrobat Required
Aragones, E. & T.R. Palfrey (2003)

Endogenous distribution, politics and the growth-equity tradeoff   Adobe Acrobat Required
Das, S.P. & C. Ghate (2003)

The Logic of Political Survival   Recommended!
Bueno de Mesquita, B., A. Smith, R.M. Siverson & J.D. Morrow (2003)
Abstract: An ambitious theoretical and empirical study of the effect of political institutions on leadership survival, the character of public policy, and economic development.

Understanding Democracy: An Introduction to Public Choice   Recommended!
Gunning, P. (2003)
Abstract: This is a comprehensive introduction to public choice, and its application to democracy, political science and economics.

Dynamic Enfranchisement   Adobe Acrobat Required
Lagunoff, R. & W. Jack (2003)

Persuasion in Politics
Murphy, K. & A. Shleifer (2004)

Growth, History and Institutions
Bertocchi, G. (2004)

Bureaucrats or Politicians? | Published I | Published II   Ingenta Select Required   ScienceDirect Required
Alesina, A. & G. Tabellini (2004/07/08)

The Political Economy of Privatization   Adobe Acrobat Required
Borner, K. (2004)

Political Institutions and Policy Volatility   Wiley Interscience Required
Henisz, W.J. (2004)

Political Competition in Government Formation: the Effect of Simultaneous Policy Bidding on the Political Outcome   Adobe Acrobat Required
Baskan, B. & F. Boffa (2004)

Inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy   Adobe Acrobat Required
Ferreira, F.H.G. & F. Campante (2004)

How do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions and Economic Policies?
Persson, T., G. Roland & G. Tabellini (2004)

The People’s Romance: Why People Love Government (as much as they do)   Recommended!
Klein, D. (2004)
Abstract: Using Schelling’s analysis of mutual coordination and focal points, I interpret Smithian sympathy as sentiment coordination. When the yearning for sentiment coordination seeks, further, for it to encompass the whole social group and looks naturally to government for the focal points, we have The People’s Romance. This yearning for encompassing sentiment coordination asserts itself by denying individual self-ownership. Government activism and coercion become romantic ends in themselves. The People’s Romance is evident in the writings of communists, social democrats, and others who champion the achieving of a “common understanding,” “common endeavor,” or “shared experience.” The People’s Romance helps to explain a wide variety of political and cultural puzzles. By and large, this collectivist yearning is deeply misguided, mainly because people neglect or underestimate its costs and damages. I explore whether The People’s Romance can be compatible with libertarian goals and values, and conclude in the negative.

Inequality, Technology, and the Social Contract
Benabou, R. (2004)

Government Gains from Self-Restraint: A Bargaining Theory of Inefficient Redistribution
Drazen, A. & N. Limao (2004)

Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Voting   Ingenta Select Required
Feddersen, T.J. (2004)

Constitutions and Economic Policy   Ingenta Select Required
Persson, T. & G. Tabellini (2004)

Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation   Adobe Acrobat Required
Lagerlof, J. & L. Frisell (2004)

A Model of Political Campaign Manipulation   Adobe Acrobat Required
Amoros, P. & M.S. Puy (2004)

A model of political parties   ScienceDirect Required
Levy, G. (2004)

Institutional Trap
Do, Q-T. (2004)

Political Budget Cycles in New versus Established Democracies
Brender, A. & A. Drazen (2004)

Corruption Around The World: Evidence From A Structural Model | Published   ScienceDirect Required   Acrobat Required
Dreher, A., C. Kotsogiannis & S. McCorriston (2004)

A Review of the Political Economy of Governance: From Property Rights to Voice
Keefer, P. (2004)

Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996–2004   Recommended!
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay & M. Mastruzzi (2005)
Abstract: This paper presents the latest update of our estimates of six dimensions of governance covering 209 countries and territories for five time periods: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004. These indicators are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 37 separate data sources constructed by 31 different organizations. We assign these individual measures of governance to categories capturing key dimensions of governance, and use an unobserved component model to construct six aggregate governance indicators in each of the four periods. We present the point estimates of the dimensions of governance as well as the margins of error for each country for the four periods. These margins of error are not unique to perceptions-based measures of governance, but are an important feature of all efforts to measure governance, including objective indicators. In fact, we provide examples of how individual objective measures provide an incomplete picture of even the quite particular dimensions of governance that they are intended to measure. We also analyze in some detail changes over time in our estimates of governance; provide a framework for assessing the statistical significance of changes in governance; and suggest a simple rule of thumb for identifying statistically significant changes in country governance over time. The ability to identify significant changes in governance over time is much higher for our aggregate indicators than for any individual indicator. While we find that the quality of governance in a number of countries has changed significantly (in both directions), we also provide evidence suggesting that there are no trends, for better or worse, in global averages of governance. Finally, we interpret the strong observed correlation between income and governance, and argue against recent efforts to apply a discount to governance performance in low income countries.

Persuasion in Politics   Ingenta Select Required
Murphy, K.P. & A. Shleifer (2004)

Endogenous Political Institutions   Ingenta Select Required
Aghion, P., A. Alesina & F. Trebbi (2004)

A Model of Bureaucracy and Corruption   Wiley Interscience Required
Shi, S. & T. Temzelides (2004)

Politicians' Motivation, Political Culture, and Electoral Competition   Acrobat Required
Beniers, K.J. & R. Dur (2004)

What Does Political Economy Tell Us about Economic Development and Vice Versa?   Recommended!   SURVEY PAPER
Keefer, P. (2004)
Abstract: Keefer reviews how three pillars of political economy—collective action, institutions, and political market imperfections—help us answer the question: Why do some countries develop and others do not? Each makes tremendous advances in our understanding of who wins and who loses in government decisionmaking, generally, but only a subset of this literature helps us answer the question. The study of political market imperfections strongly suggests that the lack of credibility of pre-electoral political promises and incomplete voter information are especially robust in explaining development outcomes. From the institutional literature, the most powerful explanation of contrasting development outcomes links political checks and balances to the credibility of government commitments.

The Political Economy of Redistribution under Democracy   Adobe Acrobat Required   Recommended!
Przeworski, A. & J. Benhabib (2004)
Abstract: We ask what redistributions of income and assets are feasible in a democracy, given the initial assets and their distribution. The question is motivated by the possibility that if redistribution is insufficient for the poor or excessive for the rich, they may turn against democracy. In turn, if no redistribution simultaneously satisfies the poor and the wealthy, democracy cannot be sustained. Hence, the corollary question concerns the conditions under which democracy is sustainable. Since decisions to save are endogenous, we solve explicitly for the current growth rates given any time path of future tax rates. We find that the optimal path of redistribution chosen by the median voter under the constraint of rebellion by the poor or the wealthy consists of redistributing as much as possible as soon as possible. However, this path is time inconsistent unless voters punish governments that deviate from their promises. Democracies survive in wealthy societies, with a lower average capital stock when they are more equal.

Political Competition in Economic Perspective   Recommended!
Bardhan, P. & T-T. Yang (2004)

Voting and the Macroeconomy   Adobe Acrobat Required   SURVEY PAPER
Hibbs Jr., D.A. (2004)

The Dynamic Reform of Political Institutions   Adobe Acrobat Required
Lagunoff, R. (2004)

Political Economy of Infrastructure Investment: A Spatial Approach   Adobe Acrobat Required
Meagher, K. & A. Ghosh (2004)

Beyond the Median: Voter Preferences, District Heterogeneity, and Political Representation
Gerber, E.R. & J.B. Lewis (2004)

The Political Economy of Corruption and the Role of Financial Institutions
Boerner, K. & C. Hainz (2004)

Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in A Young Democracy Setting   Ingenta Select Required
Akhmedov, A. & E. Zhuravskaya (2004)

Political Contribution Caps and Lobby Formation: Theory and Evidence | Published   ScienceDirect Required
Drazen, A., N. Lamao & T. Stratman (2004/07)

What Determines Long-Run Macroeconomic Stability? Democratic Institutions
Satyanath, S. & A. Subramaniam (2004)

Selling a vote   ScienceDirect Required
Quesada, A. (2004)

Optimal two stage committee voting rules   Acrobat Required
Ayres, I., C. Rowat & N. Zakariya (2004)

Explaining Conflict in Low-Income Countries: Incomplete Contracting in the Shadow of the Future   Acrobat Required
McBride, M.T. & S. Skaperdas (2005)

Special Interests and Technological Change   Wiley Interscience Required
Bellettini, G. & G.I.P. Ottaviano (2005)

Independence Before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics, and Central Bank Design   Acrobat Required
Hallett, A.H. & D.N. Weymark (2004)

Political economy of tariff unification: the case of Russia   Acrobat Required
Afontsev, S. (2004)

Populism   Acrobat Required
Frisell, L. (2004)

White elephants   ScienceDirect Required
Robinson, J.A. & R. Torvik (2005)

Politics and Efficiency of Separating Capital and Ordinary Government Budgets
Bassetto, M. & T. Sargent (2005)

Democracy, Credibility, and Clientelism
Keefer, P. & R. Vlaicu (2005)

Why the US and not Brazil? Old Elites and the Development of a Modern Economy   Acrobat Required
Dulleck, U. & P. Frijters (2004)

Economic Policies and Elections: A principal-agent point of view   Acrobat Required
Caleiro, A. (2004)

Businessman Candidates: Special-Interest Politics in Weakly Institutionalized Environments   Acrobat Required
Gehlbach, S. & K. Sonin (2004)

Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions   Acrobat Required
Lagunoff, R. (2005)

Electoral Manipulation via Expenditure Composition: Theory and Evidence | Published   ScienceDirect Required
Drazen, A. & M. Eslava (2005/10)

Hobbes to Rousseau: Inequality, Institutions, and Development
Cervellati, M., P-G. Fortunato & U. Sunde (2005)

Forms of Democracy, Policy and Economic Development
Persson, P. (2005)

Rent Seeking | Published
Chakraborty, S. & E. Dabla-Norris (2005/06)

Lobbying and Compromise
Epstein, G.S. & S. Nitzan (2005)

Political economy and economic development in Latin America in the second half of the 20th century   ScienceDirect Required
Grilli, E. (2005)

Dictators and their Viziers: Agency Problems in Dictatorships
Egorov, G. & K. Sonin (2005)

From Education to Democracy?
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, J.A. Robinson & P. Yared (2005)

Income and Democracy
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, J.A. Robinson & P. Yared (2005)

Belief in a Just World and Redistributive Politics
Benabou, R. & J. Tirole (2005)

The Political Economy of Hatred
Glaeser, E.L. (2005)

Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States | Class and Tastes: The Effects of Income and Preference Heterogeneity on Redistribution   Acrobat Required
Fernandez, R. & G. Levy (2005)

Choosing Electoral Rules: Theory and Evidence from US Cities
Aghion, P., A.F. Alesina & F. Trebbi (2005)

A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers   Ingenta Select Required
Diermeier, D., M. Keane & A. Merlo (2005)

Democratization and Clientelism: Why are Young Democracies Badly Governed?
Keefer, P. (2005)

Party Discipline and Pork Barrel Politics
Grossman, G.M. & E. Helpman (2005)

Can Democracy Educate a Society?
Gersbach, H. & L. Siemers (2005)

The political economy of government size   ScienceDirect Required
Tridimas, G. & S.L. Winer (2005)

Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Effects of Accountability and Obstacles to Policy Change   Wiley Interscience Required
Hicken, A., S. Satyanath & E. Sergenti (2005)

Populist Policies in the Transition to Democracy   Acrobat Required
Mejía, D. & C.E. Posada (2005)

Political Predation and Economic Development
Azam, J-P., R. Bates & B. Biais (2005)

Eight Questions about Corruption   Ingenta Select Required
Svensson, J. (2005)

Political Selection   Ingenta Select Required
Besley, T. (2005)

Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth   Ingenta Select Required
Morck, R., D. Wolfenzon & B. Yeung (2005)

Corruption and Political Competition   Acrobat Required
Damania, R. & E. Yalcin (2005)

Political Institutions and Trade Protection   Acrobat Required
Roelfsema, H. (2005)

Corruption, inequality, and fairness   ScienceDirect Required
Alesina, A. & G-M. Angeletos (2005)

The dynamics of government   ScienceDirect Required
Hassler, J., P. Krusell, K. Storesletten & F. Zilibotti (2005)

Having Everyone in the Boat May Sink it - Interest Group Involvement and Policy Reforms   Adobe Acrobat Required
Boerner, K. (2005)

Political Careers or Career Politicians?   Adobe Acrobat Required
Mattozzi, A. & A. Merlo (2005)

Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model   ScienceDirect Required
Banksa, J.S., J. Duggan & M. Le Bretond (2006)

Bribery: Who Pays, Who Refuses, What are the Payoffs?
Hunt, J. & S. Laszlo (2005)

Why are Some Public Officials More Corrupt than Others?
Hunt, J. (2005)

Constitutions, Politics, and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini's The Economic Effects of Constitutions   Ingenta Select Required
Acemoglu, D. (2005)

The Political Economy of Corruption and and the Role of Financial Institutions   Acrobat Required
Boerner, K. & C. Hainz (2005)

Modeling Inefficient Institutions   Recommended!
Acemoglu, D. (2006)
Abstract: Why do inefficient -- non-growth enhancing -- institutions emerge and persist? This paper develops a simple framework to provide some answers to this question. Political institutions determine the allocation of political power, and economic institutions determine the framework for policy-making and place constraints on various policies. Groups with political power, the elite, choose policies to increase their income and to directly or indirectly transfer resources from the rest of society to themselves. The baseline model encompasses various distinct sources of inefficient policies, including revenue extraction, factor price manipulation and political consolidation. Namely, the elite may pursue inefficient policies to extract revenue from other groups, to reduce their demand for factors, thus indirectly benefiting from changes in factor prices, and to impoverish other groups competing for political power. The elite's preference over inefficient policies translates into inefficient economic institutions. Institutions that can restrict inefficient policies will in general not emerge, and the elite may manipulate economic institutions in order to further increase their income or facilitate rent extraction. The exception is when there are commitment (holdup) problems, so that equilibrium taxes and regulations are worse than the elite would like them to be from an ex ante point of view. In this case, economic institutions that provide additional security of property rights to other groups can be useful. The paper concludes by providing a framework for the analysis of institutional change and institutional persistence.

A little fairness may induce a lot of redistribution in democracy   ScienceDirect Required
Tyran, J-R. & R. Sausgruber (2006)

Corruption and decentralized public governance
Shah, A. (2006)

Who Adjusts and When? On the Political Economy of Reforms | Published
Alesina, A., S. Ardagna & F. Trebbi (2006)

The Political Economy of Intergenerational Cooperation   Acrobat Required
Cigno, A. (2006)

On the measurement of political instability and its impact on economic growth   Acrobat Required
Jong-A-Pin, R. (2006)

Special Interest Politics and Endogenous Lobby Formation
Laussel, D.G. (2006)

Citizen Candidacy With Asymmetric Information
Casamatta, G. & W. Sand-Zantman (2006)

Politically Connected Firms   Ingenta Select Required
Faccio, M. (2006)

Institutions and the Resource Curse   Wiley Interscience Required
Mehlum, H., K. Moene & R. Torvik (2006)

Democracy and Development: The Devil in the Details | Published   Acrobat Required   Ingenta Select Required
Persson, T. & G. Tabellini (2006)

Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions | Published   Ingenta Select Required
Acemoglu, D. & J.A. Robinson (2006/08)

Kleptocracy and corruption   ScienceDirect Required
Fan, C.S. (2006)

Democratic Capital: The Nexus of Political and Economic Change
Persson, T. & G. Tabellini (2006)

Informational lobbying and political contributions   ScienceDirect Required
Bennedsen, M. & S.E. Feldmann (2006)

Political foundations of the resource curse   ScienceDirect Required
Robinson, J.A., R. Torvik & T. Verdier (2006)

Pork Barrel Cycles
Drazen, A. & M. Eslava (2006)

Markets Versus Governments: Political Economy of Mechanisms   Recommended!
Acemoglu, D., M. Golosov & A. Tsyvinski (2006)

Abstract: We study the optimal Mirrlees taxation problem in a dynamic economy with idiosyncratic (productivity or preference) shocks. In contrast to the standard approach, which implicitly assumes that the mechanism is operated by a benevolent planner with full commitment power, we assume that any centralized mechanism can only be operated by a self-interested ruler/government without commitment power, who can therefore misuse the resources and the information it collects. An important result of our analysis is that there will be truthful revelation along the equilibrium path (for all positive discount factors), which shows that truth-telling mechanisms can be used despite the commitment problems and the different interests of the government. Using this tool, we show that if the government is as patient as the agents, the best sustainable mechanism leads to an asymptotic allocation where the aggregate distortions arising from political economy disappear. In contrast, when the government is less patient than the citizens, there are positive aggregate distortions and positive aggregate capital taxes even asymptotically. Under some additional assumptions on preferences, these results generalize to the case when the government is benevolent but unable to commit to future tax policies. We conclude by providing a brief comparison of centralized mechanisms operated by self-interested rulers to anonymous markets.

Democratic Transitions   Recommended!   Wiley Interscience Required
Epstein, D.L., R. Bates, J. Goldstone, I. Kristensen & S. O'Halloran (2006)
Abstract: Przeworski et al. (2000) challenge the key hypothesis in modernization theory: political regimes do not transition to democracy as per capita incomes rise, they argue. Rather, democratic transitions occur randomly, but once there, countries with higher levels of GDP per capita remain democratic. We retest the modernization hypothesis using new data, new techniques, and a three-way rather than dichotomous classification of regimes. Contrary to Przeworski et al. (2000) we find that the modernization hypothesis stands up well. We also find that partial democracies emerge as among the most important and least understood regime types.

Protests and Reputation   Acrobat Required
Buenrostro, L., A. Dhillon & M. Wooders (2006)

The Political Economy of Corruption and the Role of Financial Institutions   Acrobat Required
Boerner, K. & C. Hainz (2006)

Businessman Candidates: Special-Interest Politics in Weakly Institutionalized Environments   Acrobat Required
Gehlbach, S. & K. Sonin (2006)

Political Economy of Fiscal Institutions   Acrobat Required
von Hagen, J. (2006)

The Economics of Young Democracies: Policies and Performance   Acrobat Required
Kapstein, E. & N. Converse (2006)

Optimal Electoral Timing: Exercise Wisely and You May Live Longer
Keppo, J., L. Smith & D. Davydov (2006)

Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why?   ScienceDirect Required
Shi, M. & J. Svensson (2006)

Measuring Corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: a critique of the cross-country indicators
Knack, S. (2006)

Economics of Conflict: An Overview   Acrobat Required
Garfinkel, M.R. & S. Skaperdas (2006)

Consensual and Conflictual Democratization
Cervellati, M., P. Fortunato & U. Sunde (2006)

Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence   CONFERENCE VOLUME
Congleton, R.G. & B. Swedenborg (editors) (2006)

Windfall Gains, Political Economy, and Economic Development   Acrobat Required
Dalgaard, C-J. & O. Olsson (2006)

Predatory States and Failing States: An Agency Perspective   Acrobat Required
Dixit, A. (2006)

Financial Liberalisation, Bureaucratic Corruption and Economic Development   Acrobat Required
Blackburn, K. & G.F. Forgues-Puccio (2006)

Development, Democracy and Mass Killings
Easterly, W., R. Gatti & S. Kurlat (2006)

Emergence and Persistence of Inefficient States   Acrobat Required
Agemoglu, D., D. Ticchi & A. Vindigni (2006)

Economics and Politics of Alternative Institutional Reforms
Caselli, F. & N. Gennaioli (2006)

The Political Economy of Warfare   Acrobat Required
Glaeser, E.L. (2007)

Power   Acrobat Required
Bowles, S. & H. Gintis (2007)

Parochial corruption   ScienceDirect Required
Kingston, C. (2007)

Mediocracy   Acrobat Required
Mattozzi, A. & A. Merlo (2007)

Economics and Politics of Alternative Institutional Reforms
Caselli, F. & N. Gennaioli (2007)

Deep Democracy: A Political and Social Economy Approach   Acrobat Required
Frame, M. & H.A. Khan (2007)

Political Institutions and Economic Growth
Marsiliani, L. & T.I. Renström (2007)

Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia
Olken, B.A. (2007)

Central Bank Autonomy: Lessons from Global Trends
Arnone, M., B. Laurens, J-F. Segalotto & M. Sommer (2007)

Firm innovation in emerging markets : the roles of governance and finance
Maksimovic, V., A. Demirguc-Kunt & M. Ayyagari (2007)

Governance Matters VI: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2006 | Data   Recommended!   Adobe Acrobat Required
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay & M. Mastruzzi (2007)
Abstract: This paper reports on the latest update of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) research project covering 212 countries and territories and measuring six dimensions of governance between 1996 and 2006: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. This latest set of aggregate indicators are based on hundreds of specific and disaggregated individual variables measuring various dimensions of governance taken from 33 data sources provided by 30 different organizations. The data reflect the views on governance of public sector, private sector, and nongovernmental organization experts, as well as thousands of citizen and firm survey respondents worldwide. The paper also explicitly reports the margins of error accompanying each country estimate. These reflect the inherent difficulties in measuring governanc e using any kind of data. It finds that even after taking margins of error into account, the WGI permit meaningful cross-country comparisons, as well as monitoring progress over time. In less than a decade, a substantial number of countries exhibit statistically significant improvements in at least one dimension of governance, while other countries exhibit deterioration in some dimensions. The decade-long aggregate indicators, together with the disaggregated individual indicators, are available in a newly-redesigned website at www.govindicators.org.

What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?   SURVEY PAPER
Treisman, D. (2007)

An Economic Theory of Political Institutions: Foreign Intervention and Overseas Investments   Acrobat Required
Aidt, T.S. & F. Albornoz (2007)

Influence Indices   Acrobat Required
Rusinowska, A. &l M. Grabisch (2007)

When are stabilizations delayed? Alesina–Drazen revisited   ScienceDirect Required
Martinelli, C. & R. Escorza (2007)

The Growth Effect of Democracy: Is It Heterogenous and How Can It Be Estimated?
Persson, T. & G. Tabellini (2007)

Democracy, Technology, and Growth
Aghion, P., A. Alesina & F. Trebbi (2007)

Insurgency and credible commitment in autocracies and democracies
Keefer, P. (2007)

A kleptocrat's survival guide : autocratic longevity in the face of civil conflict
Milante, G. (2007)

Corruption across countries and regions: Some consequences of local osmosis   ScienceDirect Required
Sah, R. (2007)

Corruption, uncertainty and growth   Adobe Acrobat Required
Djumashev, R. (2007)

Should market liberalization precede democracy? Causal relations between political preferences and development   Acrobat Required
Grosjean, P. & C. Senik (2007)

Corruption, uncertainty and growth   Acrobat Required
Djumashev, R. (2007)

Consensual and Conflictual Democratization, Rule of Law, and Development
Cervellati, M., P. Fortunato & U. Sunde (2007)

The dynamics of distributive politics   Acrobat Required
Battaglini, M. & T.R. Palfrey (2007)

Determinants of Direct Democracy   Acrobat Required
Fiorino, N. & R. Ricciuti (2007)

Reevaluating the Modernization Hypothesis | Published   ScienceDirect Required
Acemoglu, A., S. Johnson, J.A. Robinson & P. Yared (2007/09)

Endogenous Political Instability   Acrobat Required
Arawatari, R. & K. Mino (2007)

The Ghost of Corruption
Yavas, C. (2007)

Ethnic Diversity, Democracy, and Corruption
Yehoue, E.B. (2007)

Are All Democracies Equally Good? The Role of Interactions between Political Environment and Inequality for Rule of Law
Sunde, U., M. Cervellati & P. Fortunato (2007)

Strengthening the governance and performance of state-owned financial institutions
Scott, D.H. (2007)

Infrastructure governance and corruption: Where next?
Kenny, C. (2007)

Democracy and growth: An alternative empirical approach   Acrobat Required
Shen, J-G. (2007)

Monitoring: Which institutions matter?   ScienceDirect Required
Chen, X., J. Harford & K. Li (2007)

Oligarchic Versus Democratic Societies   Acrobat Required
Acemoglu, D. (2007)

The Political Economy of Normal Macroeconomic Pathologies
Satyanath, S. & A. Subramanian (2007)

Governance indicators: where are we, where should we be going?   Acrobat Required
Kraay, A. & D. Kaufmann (2007)

Why is Economic Policy Different in New Democracies? Affecting Attitudes About Democracy
Brender, A. & A. Drazen (2007)

World on Fire? Democracy, Globalization and Ethnic Violence   Acrobat Required
Bezemer, D. & R. Jong-A-Pin (2007)

Democracy and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis   Wiley Interscience Required
Doucouliagos, H. & M.A. Ulubasoglu (2008)

Political Entry, Public Policies, and the Economy
Mulligan, C.B. & K.K. Tsui (2008)

Rain and the Democratic Window of Opportunity   Acrobat Required
Ciccone, A. & M. Brückner (2008)

Why is Corruption Less Harmful in Some Countries Than in Others? | Published   Acrobat Required   ScienceDirect Required
Blackburn, K. & G.F. Forgues-Puccio (2008/09)

Exiting a lawless state
Hoff, K. & J.E. Stiglitz (2008)

Ideology
Bénabou, R. (2008)

A Theory of Military Dictatorships   Acrobat Required
Acemoglu, D., D. Ticchi & A. Vindigni (2008)

Dictators and Oligarchs: A Dynamic Theory of Contested Property Rights   Acrobat Required
Guriev, S. & K. Sonin (2008)

Democracy, Diversification, and Growth Reversals
Cuberes, D. & M. Jerzmanowski (2008)

Governance regimes, corruption and growth: Theory and evidence   ScienceDirect Required
Aidt, T., J. Dutta & V. Sena (2008)

Threshold Effects of Corruption: Theory and Evidence
Bose, N., S. Capasso & A.P. Murshid (2008)

Second-Best Institutions
Rodrik, D. (2008)

When Does Policy Reform Work? The Case of Central Bank Independence
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, P. Querubin & J.A. Robinson (2008)

Governance matters VII: aggregate and individual governance indicators 1996-2007
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay & M. Mastruzzi (2008)

Corruption and Power in Democracies   Acrobat Required
Giovannoni, F. & D.J. Seidmann (2008)

Electoral Competition amongst Citizen-candidates and Downsian Politicians   Acrobat Required
Roy, J. & M. Dziubinski (2008)

Democracy and Volatility: Do Special-Interest Groups Matter?   Acrobat Required
Wilson, B., D. Coates & J. Heckelman (2008)

Economic and social factors driving the third wave of democratization   ScienceDirect Required
Papaioannou, E. & G. Siourounis (2008)

Culture rules: A note on economic systems and values   ScienceDirect Required
Pryor, F.L. (2008)

Corruption and the Institutional Environment for Growth   Acrobat Required
Heckelman, J.C. & B. Powell (2008)

Democratic Errors   Adobe Acrobat Required
Ellis, C.J. & J. Fender (2008)

Media versus Special Interests
Dyck, A., D. Moss & L. Zingales (2008)

Discrete Polarisation with an Application to the Determinants of Genocides   Wiley Interscience Required
Montalvo, J.G. & M. Reynal-Querol (2008)

Democracy, rule of law, corruption incentives and growth   Acrobat Required
De la Croix, D. & C. Delavallande (2008)

Transitory Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict   Acrobat Required
Ciccone, A. (2008)

The Incidence of Civil War: Theory and Evidence   Recommended!
Besley, T.J. & T. Persson (2008)
Abstract: This paper studies the incidence of civil war over time. We put forward a canonical model of civil war, which relates the incidence of conflict to circumstances, institutions and features of the underlying economy and polity. We use this model to derive testable predictions and to interpret the cross-sectional and times-series variations in civil conflict. Our most novel emprical finding is that higher world market prices of exported, as well as imported, commodities are strong and significant predictors of higher within-country incidence of civil war.

Institutions vs. Policies: A Tale of Two Islands | Published   Ingenta Select Required
Henry, P.B. & C. Miller (2008/09)

Debt Enforcement around the World
Djankov, S., O. Hart, C. McLiesh & A. Shleifer (2008)

Political Institutions, State Capabilities and Public Policy - International Evidence   Acrobat Required
Scartascini, C., E. Stein & M. Tommasi (2008)

Two to Tangle: Financial Development, Political Instability and Economic Growth in Argentina (1896-2000)
Campos, N.F., M. Karanasos & B. Tan (2008)

Political Intergenerational Risk Sharing
D'Amato, M. & V. Galasso (2008)

Democracy and reforms
Amin, M. & S. Djankov (2009)

Democracy and the curse of natural resources   Acrobat Required
Cabrales, A. & E. Hauk (2009)

Social capital vs institutions in the growth process   ScienceDirect Required
Ahlerup, P., O. Olsson & Yanagizawa (2009)

The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa
Nunn, N. & L. Wantchekon (2009)

The Real Swing Voter's Curse | Published   Ingenta Select Required
Robinson, J.A. & R. Torvik (2009)

Civil War
Blattman, C. & E. Miguel (2009)

Legal Institutions, Sectoral Heterogeneity, and Economic Development   Wiley Interscience Required
Castro, R., G.L. Clementi & G. Macdonald (2009)

Economic Growth with Political Lobbying and Wage Bargaining   Adobe Acrobat Required
Palokangas, Tapio K. (2009)

Hold Your Nose and Vote: Why Do Some Democracies Tolerate Corruption?
Pani, M. (2009)

Governance Institutions and Economic Activity   Ingenta Select Required
Dixit, A.K. (2009)

Does democracy foster trust?   ScienceDirect Required
Rainer, H. & T. Siedler (2009)

Inequality and Sequence of Economic Liberalization and Democratization   Acrobat Required
Mizuno, N. (2009)

Do Juntas Lead to Personal Rule?   Ingenta Select Required
Acemoglu, D., G. Egorov & K. Sonin (2009)

Consolidation of New Democracy, Mass Attitudes, and Clientelism   Ingenta Select Required
Brender, A. & A. Drazen (2009)

Migration-Regime Liberalization and Social Security: Political-Economy Effect
Razin, A. & E. Sand (2009)

Integrated Political Strategy
de Figueiredo, J.M. (2009)

State Capacity, Conflict and Development/A> | Published   Wiley Interscience Required
Besley, T.J. & T. Persson (2009/10)

War and Relatedness
Spolaore, E. & R. Wacziarg (2009)

Political constraints to growth in an economic union   ScienceDirect Required
Ruta, M. (2009)

Corruption perceptions vs. corruption reality   ScienceDirect Required
Olken, B.A. (2009)

Growth in the Shadow of Expropriation
Aguiar, M. & M. Amador (2009)

Institutions Quality and Growth   Acrobat Required
Fabien, N. (2009)

Political institutions and economic volatility   ScienceDirect Required
Klomp, J. & J. de Haan (2009)

A farewell to critical junctures: Sorting out long-run causality of income and democracy   ScienceDirect Required
Gundlach, E. & M. Paldam (2009)

Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996-2008
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay & M. Mastruzzi (2009)

Political Selection and Persistence of Bad Governments
Acemoglu, D., G. Egorov & K. Sonin (2009)

Financial liberalization and democracy: The role of reform reversals
Campos, N.F. & F. Coricelli (2009)

Temporal aggregation in political budget cycles   Acrobat Required
Streb, J.B. & D. Lema (2009)

Democracy, Diversification and Growth Reversals   Wiley Interscience Required
Cuberes, D. & M. Jerzmanowski (2009)

Inequality in developing economies: The role of institutional development   Acrobat Required
Easaw, J. & A. Savoia (2009)

It Takes Two to Tango: Lobbies and the Political Business Cycle
Horgos, D. & K.W. Zimmermann (2009)

Soldiers or Bureaucrats? Conflict and the Military’s Role in Policy-Making   Acrobat Required
Leon, G. (2009)

The Political Economy of Ethnolinguistic Cleavages
Desmet, K., I. Ortuno-Ortin & R. Wacziarg (2009)

Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interest Politics under Alternative Electoral Systems   Wiley Interscience Required
Naoi, M. & E. Krauss (2009)

Power Fluctuations and Political Economy
Acemoglu, D., M. Golosov & A. Tsyvinski (2009)

Family Ties and Political Participation
Alesina, A.F. & P. Giuliano (2009)

The Politics of Growth: Can Lobbying Raise Growth and Welfare?   Acrobat Required
Julio, P. (2009)

Strong Firms Lobby, Weak Firms Bribe: A survey-based analysis of the demand for influence and corruption   Acrobat Required
Bennedsen, M., S.E. Feldmann & D.D. Lassen (2009)

Borders, Conflict and Peace
Spolaore, E. (2009)

Formal and Informal Institutions and Development   ScienceDirect Required
Casson, M.C., M.D. Giusta & U.S. Kambhampati (2009)

Inequality, Democracy, and Institutions: A Critical Review of Recent Research   ScienceDirect Required
Savoia, A., J. Easaw & A. McKay (2009)

Law and Finance at the Origin   Ingenta Select Required   SURVEY PAPER
Malmendier, U. (2009)

Political Persistence, Connections and Economic Growth   Acrobat Required
Bellettini, G., C.B. Ceroni & G. Prarolo (2009)

The Political Resource Curse
Brollo, F., T. Nannicini, R. Perotti & G. Tabellini (2010)

Institutions, Factor Prices and Taxation: Virtues of Strong States?
Acemoglu, D. (2010)

Endogenous Constitutions   Wiley Interscience Required
Ticchi, D. & A. Vindigni (2010)

Is Corruption an Efficient Grease?   ScienceDirect Required
Méon, P-G. & L. Weill (2010)

Politicians, Taxes and Debt   Wiley Interscience Required
Yared, P. (2010)

The Political Economy of Indirect Control
Padro i Miquel, G. & P. Yared (2010)

Corruption and Confidence in Public Institutions: Evidence from a Global Survey
Clausen, B., A. Kraay & Z. Nyiri (2010)

At the Frontier of Practical Political Economy: Operationalizing an Agent-Based Stakeholder Model in the World Bank’s East Asia and Pacific Region
Nunberg, B., N. Barma, M. Abdollahian, A. Green & D. Perlman (2010)

Citizen-centric governance indicators : measuring and monitoring governance by listening to the people and not the interest groups
Ivanyna, M. & A. Shah (2010)

Development Strategies: Integrating Governance and Growth
Levy, B. & F. Fukuyama (2010)

Evolution of Risk and Political Regimes
Petrova, M. & R. Bates (2010)

Do coup leaders matter? Leadership change and economic growth in politically unstable countries
Jong-A-Pin, R. & S. Yu (2010)

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Some Possibly Useful Microeconomic Tools

Long Cheap Talk   Adobe Acrobat Required
Aumann, R.J. & S. Hart (2003)

Dynamic common agency   ScienceDirect Required
Bergemann, D. & J. Välimäki (2003)

Bad Reputation   Ingenta Select Required
Ely, J.C. & J. Välimäki (2003)

Endogenous Lobbying | Updated   Adobe Acrobat Required
Felli, L. & A. Merlo (2003)

Global Coalitional Games   Adobe Acrobat Required
Rossi, G. (2003)

Lobbying, Information Transmission and Unequal Representation
Frisell, L. & J. Lagerlof (2004)

On the Dynamics of Information, Coordination and Regime Change   Recommended!   Adobe Acrobat Required
Pavan, A., G.M. Angeletos & C. Hellwig (2004)

Abstract: This paper examines how the dynamics of information influences the dynamics of coordination in an environment with strategic complementarities and heterogeneous expectations. We consider a simple dynamic global game of regime change, in which the status quo is abandoned when a sufficiently large fraction of agents attacks it. Applications include bank runs, currency crises, revolutions, and political reforms. We show that the occurrence of coordinated attacks and the timing of regime change depend, not only on the evolution of information, but also on arbitrary self-fulfilling expectations. Despite the indeterminacy in short-run dynamics, long-run outcomes are driven by fundamentals: There is a unique threshold below which regime change is inevitable in the long run. Moreover, all equilibrium paths are characterized by the succession of short phases of high risk of a crisis and long phases of tranquility, which may explain why phenomena such as speculative attacks and revolutions appear as spikes in economic or social activity.

On Optimal Rules of Persuasion   Wiley Interscience Required
Glazer, J. & A. Rubinstein (2004)

Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium   Ingenta Select Required
Dubey, P., J. Geanakoplos & M. Shubik (2004)

Relational Delegation
Alonso, R. & N. Matouschek (2005)

Complementarities and Games: New Developments   Acrobat Required
Vives, X. (2005)

Dynamic Controllability with Overlapping Targets: A Generalization of the Tinbergen-Nash Theory of Economic Policy
Di Bartolomeo, G., Acocella, N. & A. Hughes Hallett (2005)

Long Persuasion Games   Acrobat Required
Koessler, F. & F. Forges (2006)

The Structure of Unstable Power Systems   Acrobat Required
Abdou, J. (2009)

Political Risk Aversion
Valderrama, L. (2009)

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